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E92024
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民間投資運輸建設之管理代理、產品特性與激勵契約研擬
Management Agency, Product Characteristics and Incentive Contracting in Transport Infrastructure Privatization
1.江瑞祥
1.Risharng Chiang
1.國立臺灣大學政治學系
1.Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University
001,002,003,004
1.國立臺灣大學政治學系
1.Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University
002
1.行政院國家科學委員會
1.National Science Council
A.14 計畫執行期間(起):2003-08-01
A.14 計畫執行期間(訖):2004-07-31
2003-10-012004-05-31
A.16 收到日期:2004-11-02
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各國已設計高階經營團隊激勵契約(含特許公司暨政府單位)之BOT運輸建設計畫(1980-2000)

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C.2 聯絡日期:2004-11-22
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1.國立臺灣大學政治學系
1.Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University
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C.7 資料公開日期:2006-08-01
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1.互補性
2.民營化
3.共同代理
4.多項工作代理
5.替代性
6.運輸建設
7.激勵契約
1.Common Agency
2.Complements
3.Incentive Contracts
4.Multitask Agency
5.Privatization
6.Substitutes
7.Transport Infrastructure
 本研究針對開發型運輸建設民營化過程中,高階經營團隊所可能引發的資訊不對稱現象,進行激勵契約設計的理論與實證分析。在理論模式的建構方面整合多項工 作與共同代理課題,並就運輸服務與不同地產開發服務間的替代性,推導最適激勵契約設計的環境與策略。建模中發現在資訊不對稱下,委託人(設為n 位)若採分開治理下,其激勵制約能力將為聯合治理模型之n 分之一;而若委託人分別採行正向競爭且摒除罰則的激勵設計,其制約能力將高於聯合治理模型,且當服務間具完全替代性時,其制約能力更將與資訊對稱下相同, 達成最佳解。在實證分析中則以所推導的理論模式為基礎,採用Probit 模式就所蒐集的全球58 個BOT運輸計畫案進行橫斷面計量經濟分析。實證中發現當運輸服務與地產開發服務間具互補性時,董事會應給予低制約力的激勵,而政府則應給予高制約力的激 勵條件。另當各項工作間的不確定具高度相關時,則應給予高階經營團隊較低制約力之激勵。此乃因正相關將增益其風險與所需之保險,而負相關則適可分散其風 險。

This study codifies and relates critical executive incentive-contracting issue to the unique principal-agent circumstances generated from privatization of development-related transport infrastructure. It provides a framework for designing incentive contract. In the mathematical concept, an integrated multitask agency and common agency were modeled. The outcome could be simplified as: the equilibrium with n principals is exactly as if there is just one hypothetical principal with an objective function that is the sum of all the separate principals’ objectives, but the agent\'s risk aversion is multiplied n-fold. Remember that the more risk averse the agent, the lower the power of the incentive scheme. Thus, the Nash equilibrium incentive scheme with n principals has, roughly speaking, only (1/n)-th the power of the second-best scheme that would be offered by one truly unified principal. With promotion of incentive competition among the Government and the Board the incentives can be more powerful than those in the second-best. In empirical explorations, evidences show first that when transport service consumers view the output of tasks as complementary, CEOs should be given lower-powered incentives from the Board and higher-powered incentives from the Government. Second, when uncertainty across tasks is highly correlated, CEOs should also be given lower powered incentives. A positive relationship increases their risk and therefore their need for insurance. A negative relationship, in contrast, is a source of risk diversification. All of these predictions are confirmed by the empirical data.

D.16 完成檢誤日期:2005-10-18
D.17 預定釋出日期:2006-08-01
D.18 初次釋出日期:2006-08-01
D.19_1 最新版釋出日期:2006-08-01
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10.6141/TW-SRDA-E92024-1
https://efenci.srda.sinica.edu.tw/webview/index.jsp?object=https://efenci.srda.sinica.edu.tw:80/obj/fStudy/E92024
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