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E87123
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經理人固守職位行為對融資決策影響之研究
Managerial Entrenchment and Financing Decisions
1.詹家昌
1.Chia-shung Chan
1.靜宜大學企業管理學系
1.Department of Business Administration, Providence University
001,002,003,004
1.靜宜大學企業管理學系
1.Department of Business Administration, Providence University
002
1.行政院國家科學委員會
1.National Science Council
A.14 計畫執行期間(起):1997-12-01
A.14 計畫執行期間(訖):1998-11-30
A.16 收到日期:2000-04-13
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天下雜誌前150大公司

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100
002,004
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C.2 聯絡日期:2000-04-13
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1.靜宜大學企業管理學系
1.Department of Business Administration, Providence University
1
C.7 資料公開日期:2000-12-01
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1.固守職位
2.資本結構
1.Capital Structure
2.Entrenchment
在 本研究中我們證明在訊息不對稱的情況下,若加上經理人固守職位的考量,則經理人選擇權益融資將成為一個均衡的行為。而在某特定環境下,亦可導出部份分離 解,即有能力且低轉換成本的經理人將選擇負債融資,有能力且高轉換成本與低能力的經理人將選擇權益融資。這些行為的基本誘因是經理人選擇負債融資是為了利 益的分享,選擇權益融資是為了固守職位。同時,我們發現經理人所握有的股權亦會影響資本結構的選擇,並可尋得一個股權比例,使得經理人對固守職位與利益分 享呈現無差異。 在實證部分,有部分結果支持經理人為了固守職位將避免採用負債,在橫斷面的分析上,本文發現經理人的股權與在位年限可以解釋經理人固守職位下負債水準的選 擇。但當觀察負債水準的變動時,本文發現當影響經理人職位的威脅降低時,公司負債水準有顯著增加的趨勢,但在股東監督方面,如董事會是否有大股東加入對公 司負債水準卻沒有顯著的影響。

In this research , we demonstrate that information asymmetries within a firm along with managerial entrenchment concerns can jointly result in equity finance at the equilibrium. Under some specificcircumstances , a partially separating equilibrium is obtained . That is, talented managers with low relocation cost will choose debt finance, talented managers with high relocation and untalented managers will choose equity finance. The basic motivation for these behaviors is that managers choose debt finance for profit sharing and managers choose equity finance in order to entrench themselves . Further, we find managers\' ownership share will affect the choice of capital structure . A proportion of management ownership can be found at which managers are indifferent about whether to entrench themselves or share profits. The results with the empirical parts partially suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. In a cross-sectional analysis, we find managerial ownership and tenure can explain the leverage levels with which CEOs are entrenched. In an analysis of leverage changes, we find that leverage significantly increase in the aftermath of entrenchment-reducing shocks to managerial security. But In active monitoring , the addition to the board of major stockholders is no significantly effect on the leverage levels.

D.16 完成檢誤日期:2001-03-27
D.17 預定釋出日期:0000-00-00
D.18 初次釋出日期:2001-04-17
D.19_1 最新版釋出日期:2001-04-17
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10.6141/TW-SRDA-E87123-1
https://efenci.srda.sinica.edu.tw/webview/index.jsp?object=https://efenci.srda.sinica.edu.tw:80/obj/fStudy/E87123
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