

# 科技部補助專題研究計畫報告

## 總統滿意度之研究

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本研究具有政策應用參考價值：☒否 ☐是，建議提供機關  
(勾選「是」者，請列舉建議可提供施政參考之業務主管機關)  
本研究具影響公共利益之重大發現：☐否 ☐是

中 華 民 國 109 年 09 月 14 日

中文摘要：民眾對總統的滿意度是總統施政表現的反映，滿意度高的總統象徵更多的權力及更高的統治能力，總統滿意度的研究通常也與深植於民主理論的重要議題有關。民眾對總統的滿意度，是民眾對於總統表現之意見反映，也是給予總統的評鑑，然而國內對於此一領域的研究並不多見。在台灣以民主選舉產生國家領導人已成為常態的情況下，實有必要對總統滿意度進行定期且有系統的調查，以長期累積研究資料。本研究結合質性以及量化的研究，研擬適當的測量工具，以檢視民眾對總統表現滿意度的持續與變遷情形、探討影響我國民眾對總統滿意度的各種可能因素、觀察總統滿意度與政策推行之間的關係，以及其他可能的政治效果。

中文關鍵詞：總統滿意度、施政表現、民意、政治效果

英文摘要：Presidential popularity is the “causal agent” of presidential effectiveness. High approval rating means more power and greater ability to govern. Research of presidential approval speaks to important questions rooted in democratic theory. Therefore, the performance of the president is not only relevant to the functioning of national institutions, but also closely related with people's daily lives. Presidential popularity reflects people's satisfaction toward the president, as well as the evaluation of the president. However, study about presidential popularity is rare in Taiwan. Given the situation that democratically elected president has become a norm in Taiwan, conducting regular and systematic surveys to accumulate long-term data are essential to the study of presidential popularity. This project intends to utilize both quantitative and qualitative approaches to study presidential popularity. Specifically, it aims to develop new measurement for presidential popularity, examine the continuity or fluctuation of public opinion, detect the connection between policy implementation and presidential popularity, as well as explore the influential factors that affect presidential popularity.

英文關鍵詞：presidential popularity, presidential approval rating, public opinion, political effect

## 一、前言

民眾對總統的滿意度是總統施政表現的反映，滿意度高的總統象徵更多的權力及更高的統治能力，總統滿意度的研究通常也與民主理論的重要議題有關(Wang and Cheng 2015)。自 1940 年代，美國民調機構即持續研究總統滿意度，累積的民調資料也相當可觀，結合報紙重要事件的報導、總體經濟指標以及戰爭傷亡人數等相關總體資訊，使得美國總統滿意度的研究成果相當豐碩，但國內在此一領域的研究並不多見，學術界也並未因此而對此一問題有較多的注意，至今也僅有零星幾篇研究出現，究其原因，可能主要來自於資料的限制。由於以調查蒐集研究資料的方式，大約是在 1990 年左右才開始在台灣的政治學界受到較多的重視，媒體也大約是在同時期陸續成立專門機構，較有系統地進行民意的調查，經過廿多年的時間，國內的調查技術及品質漸臻成熟，然而在選舉的相關調查中，學術界的焦點通常在於投票行為的研究，總統滿意度經常只是附屬於其中的一兩個綜合性的題目，且限於研究經費，並未進行定期及系統性的總統滿意度調查，因而缺乏相關資料可供進行研究；媒體雖然對政治首長的施政滿意度相當關注<sup>1</sup>，但研究者除了資料取得不易外，也因為媒體通常著重於新聞性，對於總統的聲望調查，「特殊事件情境下的調查多過定期性調查」（周祖誠 2009:19），較少是定期舉行，比較多是附屬於特定事件的調查，而且媒體的調查中除了基本的人口變數外，很少包括進行學術研究所需的相關變數，因此較難以媒體資料進行研究；其次可能是來自時間的限制，我國自 1996 年才開始有直選的總統，至今總共也只有六次總統選舉，時間的長度及總統人數尚無法形成通則，多數研究只能針對單一總統或單一任期進行。2012 年起政治學界的大型計畫「台灣選舉與民主化調查」(TEDS)開始定期及系統性地進行總統滿意度的調查，至今仍每季定期進總統滿意度的調查；目前 TEDS 總統滿意度調查已累積相當的資料，本計畫希望在現有資料的基礎上，有系統地探討影響總統的滿意度因素及其效應。

## 二、研究目的

在 2016 年 1 月以得票率 56.1%（689 萬餘票）當選的蔡英文總統，不僅在總統選舉中獲得勝利，在立法委員選舉部份，民進黨贏得 49 席區域立委及 18 席不分區立委，再加上 1 席原住民立委，總共 68 席立委，佔立法院總席次的 60.2%，為民進黨首次的完全執政。根據 TEDS 總統滿意度的調查（見圖 1），蔡英文總統在 2016 年 6 月上任一個月之後，約有一半(52.7%)民眾對她的表現表示肯定，不滿意的僅有 16.3%；然而在她上任 4 個月後 2016 年 9 月調查，民眾對她的不滿意度已上昇至 39.6%，甚至高於滿意其表現的 38.8%，自此之後，蔡英文總統的滿意度即一路下滑，2018 年 9 月的調查則顯示民眾對蔡英文總統的不滿意度，已接近六成（58.4%），滿意度僅有 24.6%。2018 年 11 月的九合一選舉，完全執政的民進黨遇到空前的挫敗，在縣市首長部份，拿到六個縣市，甚至失去執政逾廿年的高雄市，縣市議員部份也輸給國民黨（238 席 vs. 394 席），六都及縣市長部份得票率僅占全台灣的 39.2%，低於 2014 年 47.5%將近 8.3%，得票數(4,897,730)，也較 2014 年(5,830,106)

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<sup>1</sup> 根據周祖誠的統計，在李登輝總統執政的 12 年間，聯合報共進行 104 次總統聲望調查，陳水扁總統任期內則有 102 次；TVBS 在 1996-2000 年李登輝總統執政期間，共進行了 20 次總統聲望調查，陳水扁總統任期內則有 76 次(周祖誠 2009:17)。至於馬英九總統（當選及）上任的二年半以來，媒體進行的調查中包含其滿意度者，計有：遠見雜誌有 30 次，TVBS 37 次，聯合報 12 次。




圖1 蔡英文總統滿意度(201606-201809)

資料來源：TEDS總統滿意度調查

低了 93 萬餘票<sup>2</sup>。對於此次的敗選，一般皆認為是中央執政不力所致，除了蔡英文總統為「中央執政造成選舉沉重負擔致歉」<sup>3</sup>，行政院長賴清德也指出中央執政的五大缺失為：「基層民眾對經濟成長無感、一例一休修法造成民怨、改革引發重大不滿、政府第一時間無法遏止假訊息流傳與不實攻擊，以及立法行十大罪狀，讓「討厭民進黨」變成全台最大黨<sup>4</sup>。針對排山倒海而來的責難，蔡英文總統表示願意深自反省與檢討，並於 2018 年 12 月 6 日開始第一次的「迴廊談話」談敗選的檢討，<sup>5</sup>未來也可能成為常態性直接面對民眾及回應民

<sup>2</sup> 中央選舉委員會公告資料，<http://db.cec.gov.tw/histMain.jsp?voteSel=20181101B1>。檢索日期：2018 年 12 月 24 日。

<sup>3</sup> 中央通訊社，<https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/201811270198.aspx>。檢索日期：2018 年 12 月 24 日。

<sup>4</sup> 十大罪狀為：1.請吳音寧當北農「250 萬實習生」；2.砍軍公教年金，還說「自私自利」；3.一例一休，沒人過勞死，勞工怒了；4. 815 大停電，陳金德下台竟代理縣長；5. 823 大淹水 副總統去度假；6. 陳菊領頭 高雄幫台北當大官；7. 一句東廠走了張天欽，冒出各種廠；8. 過失全推假新聞，還要監控臉書；9. 乾淨的煤蓋深澳電廠，再創髮夾彎；10.做功德幹話連連，一副撲克牌出不完。聯合新聞網，<https://theme.udn.com/theme/story/6773/3471993>。檢索日期：2018 年 12 月 25 日。

<sup>5</sup> 中時電子報，<https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20181206002777-260407>。檢索日期：2018 年 12 月 24 日。

意的方式，例如在第二及第政互動溝通不足，民意無法即時反映在政策檢討上」<sup>6</sup>，媒體則列出蔡英文執政後的三次的迴廊談話時，分別談了機車加裝 ABS 及非洲豬瘟問題，顯示蔡總統對於中央執政問題，將採取正面回應的態度。但是就選後的民調來看，蔡英文總統的滿意度在選後未見回升，也創新低到僅有 24.1%<sup>7</sup>，一般皆認為從六都選舉的結果來看，蔡英文總統的「期中考」顯然是不及格的，她的也連任之路因此有相當多的變數，甚至民進黨內也出現要蔡英文總統放棄連任的聲音<sup>8</sup>，因此，蔡英文總統在 2020 總統大選前，將採取何種策略或推行何種政策，以挽救低落的聲望，也是值得觀察的重點。

在台灣以民主選舉產生國家領導人已成為常態，且政黨也已多次輪替，政黨政治漸趨成形的情況下，實有必要在過去的研究基礎之上，以定期且有系統的調查，長期累積研究資料，探討影響總統滿意度的因素及其政治效果。目前 TEDS 的總統滿意度調查已有 2012 年至今每季的資料，未來也會持續定期進行調查，本研究將以 TEDS 調查為主要研究資料，同時也將應用焦點團體訪談，結合質性及量化的資料，以混合性方法（mixed method）的研究設計，檢視民眾對總統表現滿意度的變化情形、探討影響我國民眾對總統滿意度的各種可能因素、總統滿意度與政策推行之間的關係、執政表現對地方選舉的影響、總統滿意度與是否連任或政黨輪替的關聯性、以及其他可能的政治效果。

### 三、文獻探討

關於總統滿意度一詞，常用的有 presidential popularity 與 presidential approval (rating)，二者的差別，正如 Stimson(1976:1)所言：presidential popularity 或許是 presidential approval 的錯誤用法，二者雖然在概念及應用上應該都是不同的，例如 Richard Nixon 或許從來都不受「歡迎」（popular），但施政表現卻經常被「贊許」（approved），而他的繼任者 Gerald Ford 則剛好相反，是一個受到歡迎的人，但他的施政表現則很少被贊許。不過即使 Stimson 認為 presidential popularity 與 presidential approval 有所不同，但也特別說明在其文章中，這二個詞仍然必須交替使用，因為二者有不同適合使用的時機。Stimson 的說明，也顯示國外學者對於這二個詞，大部份都沒有很嚴格的區分，例如 Newman and Forcehimes (2010:144) 曾寫道：“Since Muller’s [Muller, J., 1970. *Presidential popularity from Truman to Johnson. The American Political Science Review* 64(1), 18-34.] pioneering study, students of *presidential approval ratings* have agreed that major events affect these rating.”此段文字引用 Muller 標題為 presidential popularity 的文章，但 Newman and Forcehimes 文中則直接使用 presidential approval rating，應該是將二者視為同義詞，而其他學者也各有不同的用法<sup>9</sup>。由於目前大部份美國學者對總統表現的測量是 “Do you approve

<sup>6</sup>大紀元，<https://www.epochtimes.com.tw/n268158/%E6%95%97%E9%81%B8%E6%AA%A2%E8%A8%8E-%E8%B3%B4%E6%8F%86%E7%B4%B0%E6%95%B8%E4%BA%94%E5%A4%A7%E7%BC%BA%E5%A4%B1.html>。檢索日期：2018 年 12 月 24 日。

<sup>7</sup>聯合新聞網，<https://www.gvm.com.tw/article.html?id=55379>。檢索日期：2018 年 12 月 25 日。

<sup>8</sup>聯合新聞網，<https://udn.com/news/story/6656/3505315>。檢索日期：2018 年 12 月 25 日。

<sup>9</sup>在申請人所蒐集的文獻中，可以發現有些學者使用 presidential popularity，例如 Piereson 1975、Kenski 1977、Sigelman 1979、Lewis-Beck and Rice 1982、Brody and Sigelman 1983、Dolan, Frensdreis and Tatalovich 2009、Geys 2010；也有人使用 presidential approval (rating)，例如 Cohen 2002、2011、Gronk, Koch and Wilson 2003、Kriner 2006、Lebo 2008、Gronke, Koch and Wilson 2003、Newman 2003、Highton 2012、

or disapprove of the way [the incumbent] is handling his job as president?” 此種問法 approval (rating) 比較傾向指「施政表現」，然而 popularity 顧名思義在中文的譯法較接近「滿意度」，和英文一樣雖然概念上並不相同，然而在評估總統時，二者有不同的內涵，也有不同的應用時機，但是在應用上也和英文一樣，可能必須交替使用。申請人認為對總統的評估不止於施政上的表現，也與其人格特質、意識型態或政治立場有關，因此在中文以「滿意度」似乎較能符合廣義及整合的評估之意，但是在本計畫中也同樣會因不同脈絡及時機而有不同的用法，例如在兩岸關係的處理上，我們討論的可能是民眾對於總統處理該兩岸關係的表現滿不滿意(approved)，而對總統人格特質的評估，討論的則可能是總統的誠信或清廉是不是受到民眾的贊賞(popular)。

以下就國內外相關文獻進行評析。

### (1)國外相關文獻

由於美國是總統制的國家，總統滿意度的研究也由美國開始，美國學者在總統滿意度的相關研究中，主要聚焦於以下的問題：

#### 1) 總統滿意度對於總統權力運用的重要性

研究總統滿意度的先驅 Muller 指出，代議政治是將政治社群的成員與權威當局連結的重要機制，因為成員可以檢視權威當局是否支持或是代表成員的利益，並評估權威當局表現是否令其滿意，成員對於權威當局滿意度的評估，會進一步變成其成員對於政治體系的支持(Muller 1970:1149)，Neustadt (1973)也指出滿意度高低會影響總統與國會協商政策的能力，也影響總統權力的行使，因此總統滿意度是構成總統權力的重要因素之一，也是總統是否能夠順利推動政務的依據。Ostrom and Simon(1985)也認為總統滿意度的重要性，在於滿意度高的總統，在國會的提案通過機會較高，所以滿意度高的總統在推動政策時，也較不會受到挑戰(Skorownek 1998; Neustadt 1990; Kernell 1986)；而現代選民期待總統有推動政策的領導能力，國會選舉的勝利表示立法及政策得以推動，可能對選民而言是一種總統可以達到領導期待的象徵，而一個能夠成功推動法案的總統又較能得到選民的贊同，得到更高的滿意度(Cohen 2013:300)。Lebo(2008)的研究也顯示總統滿意度與國會滿意度之間有正向的關係，選民會將對總統的觀感轉換為對國會的評價，甚至是以國會選舉的選票做為對總統政策的公投(Gronke, Koch and Wilson 2003:785)，因此，滿意度較高的總統，往往可以在為國會議員選舉中產生「拉拔效果」(coattail effect)，許多研究都顯示，總統的滿意度高低，對於同黨國會議員選舉有重要的影響(Piereson 1975; Tufte 1978; MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1989; Marra and Ostrom 1989; Erikson 1990; Cohen, Krassa and Jamman 1991; Cohen 2011)。另外，Kernell(1986:187)也指出沒有得到過半滿意度總統很難獲得連任，而投票行為的研究也指出，如果當現任者的表現一直很好時，挑戰者很難說服選民他能比現任者更好(Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 2002:152)，因此民眾對總統表現的滿意度，不僅影響其政治合法性(political legitimacy)，也影響其繼續執政的可能性。

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Abrajano and Burnett 2012、Berlemann and Enkelmann 2014；然而也有不少的學者，和 Stimson 一樣，在文章中二個名詞同時使用，例如 Muller(Edward)1970、Kernell 1978、Shapiro and Conforto 1980、Ostrom and Simon 1985、Norpoth 1984、Tedin 1986、Eisenstein and Witting 2000、Druckman and Holmes 2004、Chang and Lee 2010、Campbell、Dettrey and Yin 2010、Newman and Forcehimes 2010、Tang and Chang 2016。

## 2) 影響總統滿意度的因素

Mueller (1973:197)指出影響總統滿意度的重要因素是：擔任總統的時間長短、經濟、重要國際事件、以及戰爭。後續學者的研究，也大都遵循 Muller 此一說法。就擔任總統時間而言，新總統當選就職後，通常都會有一段時間的蜜月期，但是隨著上任後所推動的政策，如果政策不如理想、未履行競選時的政見或是有負面新聞出現時，滿意度就會逐漸下滑；Stimson (1976) 也持同樣的看法，認為總統的滿意度會隨著時間而衰退，隨著其執政時間愈久，推行的政策愈多，對政策不滿意的情況也會累積，滿意度就會下降。所以 Mueller (1973:233-237) 也指出，多數總統在任職期間的滿意度都是愈來愈低；不過也有例外，例如「愛森豪現象」(the Eisenhower phenomenon)，在愛森豪任內，他的聲望有上下波動而非持續下降，Mueller 認為主要原因除了愛森豪是戰爭英雄、溫和的個人特質、終結韓戰、政治生手(amateur status)、及處在美國社會風氣良好的 1950 年代之外，也應與他因為他任內大都遵循前人的政策，並未推動太多重大政策，所以沒有得罪太多選民有關。不過也有學者對於時間變數提出質疑，認為時間與滿意度沒有因果關係(Kernell 1978) 或者認為時間表示的是滿意度的變化，不能作為影響因素(Brody 1991)。

影響總統滿意度的另一個重要因素是經濟，由於經濟攸關國家命脈，而經濟情況的好壞更是民眾日常最切身的體會，許多研究指出，國家經濟情況的好壞，是影響民眾對施政滿意程度的重要因素，不論是國民所得、失業率、通貨膨脹的消長等問題，都可能會造成民眾對施政滿意度的波動 (Brody 1991; Eisenstein and Witting 2000; Erikson 1990; Fiorina 1981; Kinski 1977 a,b; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Monroe 1978; Norpoth 1984; Ostrom and Simon 1985)，然而MacKuen(1983)的研究則顯示失業率對於總統滿意度有短期的影響，但這種效應很快就會消失，通貨膨脹的效應持續較長，似乎有較強的影響。Muller也特別指出：經濟狀況不佳會讓民眾對於執政者不滿，但經濟好轉未必有助於提昇他的滿意度(Mueller 1973:215)；也有研究指出不同的經濟狀況環境，對於總統滿意度的影響不同(Berlemann and Enkelmann 2014, Dickerson 2016)，尤其是有重要的事件發生時，經濟因素也可能變得不重要，例如小布希總統任內發生911事件及伊拉克戰爭，研究顯示經濟因素對其滿意度沒有影響，顛覆傳統的研究結果(Ostrom, Kraitzman, Newman and Abramson 2018; Eichenberg, Stoll, and Lebo 2006; Norpoth and Sidman 2007)。另外，新聞媒體及政治菁英也會影響人們對經濟的期待，從而影響總統的滿意度(MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992)，Dickerson(2016) 比較美國四個不同時期的追蹤調查資料(1990-1991-1992, 1992-1994-1996, 2000-2002-2004, 2008-2009-2010)，指出不同的政治經濟情況時，經濟感受和總統滿意度之間的關係會有不同，他發現經濟的感受對總統滿意度的效應，在大蕭條(2008-2009-2010)的時候，比先前其他三個時期更強。他認為這是因為民眾是以他們既有的政治態度來處理經濟訊息，所以當經濟不好時，民眾暴露於大量的負面經濟訊息之中，政治和經濟考量會有所衝突，經濟的感受對總統滿意度的作用會較強；而經濟情況好時，認同與評價就能回歸同步，政治態度又能成為更有用的捷徑，總統滿意度對經濟感受的效用較強 (2016:1037)。因此，到底是經濟感受使得選民改變他們的政治態度？還是對經濟的感受會因既有的政治態度而傾斜？ Dickerson認為必須從廣泛的政治與經濟背景來做更進一步的觀察(Dickerson 2016: 1057)。Acevedo, Fogleman and Ura則分析1978-2008年間總統滿意度季報中的教育世代，發現教育是經濟感受及判斷總統表現之間關係的中介，美國低教育程度的民眾，在評估總統時，顯著受過去經濟表現的影響，而高教育程度者，則是從



對長期經濟的期待來評估總統表現，而總體的總統滿意度，則是受到複雜經濟信號的影響 (Acevedo, Fogleman and Ura 2017:230)。

至於事件對總統滿意度的影響，在於考驗領導人處理突發的事件或危機的能力 (Norpoth 1984)，包括對國內外的重大衝突、政策的瑕疵以及國際性的危機或軍事行動等正負面事件的處理及後果 (Brace and Hinckley 1992)。Mueller 他認為事件必須是國際性的、與美國及特定總統相關、且是眾所矚目的事件 (Mueller 1973:209-210)，當國家發生重大事件時，民眾會特別支持國家，出現「擁護領導中心」(rally-round-the flag) 的效果，而讓總統的滿意度提高 (Muller 1973:208)，例如 911 事件對美國人民的安全意識產生長期的衝擊，對安全的威脅也會增長民眾對總統的滿意度 (Ostrom, Kraitzman, Newman and Abramson 2018)，Brody (1991) 的研究顯示政治菁英、媒體及政黨認同在擁護事件 (rally event) 上對總統滿意度有影響；而具有高度媒體關注度的事件，會增加事件對個人評估總統的重要性 (Krosnick and Kinder 1990)，但事件必須對個人很重要，才會影響個人對總統的評估，所以事件的客觀重要性不是關鍵，而是事件對個人相對的重要性，才會影響總統滿意度 (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Ostrom and Simon 1988; Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Krosnick and Brannon 1993; Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch 1995; Druckman and Holmes 2004)。Ostrom, Kraitzman, Newman and Abramson (2018) 則將傳統的繁榮 (Prosperity)、和平 (Peace) 與安全 (Security) 視為環境因素，將經濟 (以通貨膨脹和失業率為指標)、戰爭 (伊拉克及阿富汗戰爭的死亡人數)、911 攻擊做為測量變數，同時也將重大事件 (包括可能影響滿意度特別及平常事件) 及其重要程度 (salience) 納入對小布希總統的滿意度測量，結果發現當事件很重要時，就有強烈的效應，在小布希總統任內，經濟、恐怖主義及伊拉克戰爭等因素的重要性之跨時變化，對小布希的滿意度有強大的影響 (Ostrom, Kraitzman, Newman and Abramson 2018)。Lee and Hwang (2015) 分析 1993-2008 年的韓國總統滿意度資料，發現和北韓的軍事危機，會使總統的滿意度下降，這些危機並沒有在南韓產生所謂的「聚旗效應」(rally-round-the flag effect) 效應，只有高峰會才能產生聚旗效應 (rally effect)，提升總統的滿意度，即使是在控制任職時間、經濟情況、以及政治醜聞之後仍舊一樣。他們的分析也發現是多樣化的資訊線索及高度的網路穿透力，限制了菁英及媒體的影響 (Lee and Hwang 2015: 685)。他們認為不同的外交危機，對於總統的支持會不同的效果，韓國民眾 (尤其是戰後世代) 反而將外交危機視之為總統無能的表現 (Lee and Hwang 2015: 687)。韓國的研究對於 rally effect 現象提供一個不同於美國的分析背景，發現這個理論可能因為不同的社會、歷史或政治背景而有所改變 (Lee and Hwang 2015: 688)。對於事件的研究，也突顯目前媒體及網路傳播不僅對總統滿意度有重要影響，對國家的政治發展也占有重要的地位。

戰爭也是 Muller 認為會影響總統滿意度的一個因素，他指出戰爭會降低總統的滿意度，尤其隨著戰爭的進行，傷亡人數不斷累加，對於總統的壓力愈大 (Mueller 1973:216-217)，許多研究也都確認戰爭與和平對於總統滿意度有深遠的影響 (Kernell 1978, Ostrom and Simon 1985, Eichenberg, Stoll and Lobo 2006)；Geys 則強調戰爭的成本也必須加以計算，因為成本是真實的，民眾可以看得到的也可以理解的，他以 1948-2008 年的資料證實此一說法，但是他也發現戰爭的財務成本直接影響總統滿意度，主要是在韓戰時期，然而在經濟狀況較好的阿富汗及伊拉克戰爭時，因戰爭而來的支出，可能被視為經濟發展的刺激，反而較不會引起負面反應。

除了 Muller 所主張的影響因素之外，由於美國第一位黑人總統歐巴馬的當選，也使得種族成為探討總統滿意度的另一個因素，Abrajano and Buenett (2012) 使用 Time/CNN 對科林



頓總統1992年1月到1995年6月的滿意度調查資料，及歐巴馬總統2009年1月到2011年6月的CNN滿意度調查資料，比較黑人及白人對於二位總統的滿意度是否有所差異。結果發現白人對於歐巴馬總統的評價確實較低，而黑人對於歐巴馬總統的高滿意度，則是相當持續且顯著高於全體民眾；而且對歐巴馬總統的支持，和柯林頓總統相比，黑人和白人的差異程度也顯著較高，顯示種族尊嚴及團結意識，在對黑人總統歐巴馬的評價上，顯然扮演重要角色(Abrajano and Buennett 2012)。

### 3)評價總統滿意度的方法

Muller(1970:1149)認為成員對權威當局表現的認知未必全然奠基於「工具性的表現滿意」(instrumental performance satisfaction)，有時也視其對權威當局「符號性的表現滿意」(symbolic performance satisfaction)。在他後續的研究中，針對民眾對於權威當局的表現(performance)歸類為工具性的(instrumental)、表達性的(expressive)以及外來的(extraneous)表現三種，他認為民眾會因為對這些不同表現的滿意程度，而決定是否給予權威當局支持。不過 Muller 認為民眾在評估權威當局的工具性表現之前，需具備一定資訊且對政治事務積極關注，他們會因為特定政策輸出（不）符合其預期而表現（不）滿意，例如，選民會因為特定政治人物所持的立場與其相同，而對此工具現表現感到滿意；至於民眾無法對權威當局的表現與特定政策輸出連結，體系成員也會因為政治人物的一些符號性行為而感到滿意，例如民眾會因為特定政治人物是某政黨的成員而對其支持；當然，選民也可能僅因為受家人影響而喜歡特定政治人物，此即屬於外來的支持 (1970:1154-6, 1155 fn.31)。

Ostrom 與 Simon (1985)則提出一個解釋模型來說明事件如何影響總統滿意度。他們認為民眾對於總統的評估，是基於自己的期望，而這評估決定是比較自身期望及總統實際表現間的作用，他們認為民眾的期望並不是針對某位總統，而是總統此一職位，而且所有的總統都被期待要帶來和平與繁榮、維持國內的安定、以及維持總統職位本身的威信與正直，這是以制度為基礎(institution-based)的期待，這些期待不會因不同總統而改變；另外，民眾對不同總統也會有不同期待，例如總統在競選期間提出的政見或是對一些問題的解決方案，他們所選擇的議題及對這些問題的立場，會使民眾對勝選的總統有必須完成這些任務的期待，這是以不同總統為基礎(occupant-based)的評估(Ostrom and Simon 1985: 336-338)。他們也認為媒體在這些評估中扮演重要角色，媒體報導提供大眾訊息以做出期待及評估，以上述的二種期待基礎及媒體的報導內容型態，結合制度及以職位為基礎兩個角度，再將國際、國內及個人事件，分別分為預期及非預期形式，而區分出如表 1 所示的 12 種評估總統的事件類型(Ostrom and Simon 1985, 陳陸輝、耿曙 2009b:351)。他們以此標準檢驗 1953-1972 年間重要事件與總統滿度的關係，結果發現民眾對總統的評估，是依據他們對現實世界的社會與經濟情況的品質，以及國際事務結果的經驗感受；而民眾對總統支持與否，也會影響總統如何做成決定。因此，他們也發現總統會有強烈的動機去採取一些策略，來影響民眾的支持，所以民眾支持如何影響總統的目標、計畫及行動，也成為重要的研究議題(Ostrom and Simon 1985:354)。

表 1：評價總統相關事件的類型

	預期的			非預期的		
	國際	國內	個人	國際	國內	個人
制度為主	和平	繁榮	繼任	危機	社會動盪	總統誠信
個人為主	強權外交政策	立法活動	通過法案	外交活動	國內政策	個人困頓

資料來源：Ostrom and Simon 1985: 338; 陳陸輝、耿曙 2009b: 351

Newman and Forcehimes(2010)則認為因為對事件的選擇標準不一樣，除了無法進行比較研究之外，也有可能研究結果不同僅是因為選擇事件的標準不同，因此他們依循Muller(1970)、Ostrom and Simon(1985)、Brace and Hinckley(1992)等學者的研究，以及Brody(1991)及Zaller(1992)等關於媒體報導對民意及總統滿意度的影響等研究，提出選擇事件的標準，並以此標準選擇及製作一份1953-2006年的重大事件目錄，他們以此一目錄進行分析，結果發現與現存的總統滿意度研究結果一致。

由於網路及社群媒體的影響與日益增，有些學者也開始使用網路資料進行總統滿意度研究，例如Gonzalez-Bailo, Banchs and Kaltenbrunner(2012)使用Usenet自1999年到2005年2月的資料來分析民眾的情緒變化，探討對政治事件的情緒反應如何影響民意。這份資料所涵蓋的期間內，有兩次美國總統大選、911恐怖襲擊事件、與在阿富汗和伊拉克的軍事行動。研究結果顯示，民眾對政治事件的情緒反應有助於解釋該時期的總統滿意度，總統選舉並沒有增加太多的情緒反應，但911事件及在阿富汗及伊拉克的戰爭，則使得總統的滿意度立刻上昇，除此之外，此研究也為線上討論在民眾如何回應政治事件，提供經驗性研究的方法及認識 (Gonzalez-Bailo, Banchs and Kaltenbrunner 2012)。

此外，雖然也有許多研究指出總統的個人特質與選民如何評估總統有關 (Miller, Wattenberg and Malanchuk 1986; Mondak 1995; Greene 2001; Ruscio 2004)，但也有一些關於總統的個人特質和個人魅力對於總統滿意度影響的研究指出，個人特質及領袖魅力的作用並不如強調，例如Newman從誠信角度探討1998-2000年間四位美國的總統滿意度，結果顯示雖然對總統本人的評估，也是對總統表現評估的一部份，但良好品格僅是反映民眾在評估總統時所喜歡的特質，實質的政治因素對總統滿意度還是有更大的影響(Newman 2003:335)；Edwards的研究結果也指出「沒有系統性的證據來證明有能夠稱之為魅力的(charismatic)特殊領導型態存在，無法使用此種概念去辨識誰有魅力，也沒有辦法確認其影響，魅力無法用以解釋總統為何得到或無法得到大眾支持，因此，魅力的概念顯然既無法有效地分析，也沒有經驗性的助益」(Edwards 2002:43)。不過我們可以觀察網路時代所造就的英雄（網紅）現象，例如美國總統川普、俄國總統普丁，甚至台灣柯文哲及韓國瑜二位市長，則突顯個人特質與魅力，或許已轉變成探討新世代領袖的重要因素，值得加以注意。

和上述研究較不同的研究途徑，則是跨領域的基因研究，他的研究發現對總統表現的評估受到人們基因組成的強烈影響，他的模型顯示對總統滿意度評估有影響的政治興趣、政治練達、及政治意識型態，有50%以上是基因遺傳，不僅個人對政訊息的反應是基因傾向，甚至人們對於週遭政治環境的意識，也是基於他們的基因組成(Miles 2015: 766)，大部分的總統滿意度評估是基因可遺傳的，僅有一小部份是受家庭社會化的影響(Miles 2015: 767)；但他也認為這並不表示總統滿意度評估是堅定不可動搖，或不會因應特殊情況而快

速變化，因為導致人們會蒐集較多訊息去評估總統表現的政治興趣，可能受先天的影響較大，所以基因遺傳可以解釋為何擁護事件、蜜月期、及經濟等短期影響總統表現的評估因素，以及為何一些評估因素是無法改變的(Miles 2015: 773)，但政黨認同的強度可能會讓他們改變詮釋訊息的方式，亦即總統表現的評估可能有實質的基因成份，但也會被個人獨特非基因性成份所改變。因此，Miles認為心理及社會化理論對於總統滿意度已有許多研究，但最全面性的解釋可能必須包括生物基因的影響。此一研究雖然沒有使用代表性的樣本，也為總統滿意度的研究，開啟一個創新及跨領域的可能性。

## (2)國內相關文獻

國內學界對總統滿意度的研究不多，最早較有系統討論總統聲望的研究，是於周祖誠 1999 年發表的「李登輝總統聲望初探：1989-1999」，在這一篇文章中，他運用聯合報民意調查研究中心 1989 年 8 月到 1999 年 10 月所進行的調查中，42 次關於李登輝總統聲望定期性調查資料以及總體資料，分析影響李登輝聲望變化的原因。他的研究發現：執政時間、政府施政滿意度及國民黨得票率對李登輝總統聲望變化有所影響，但若時間因素去除，模型仍有很高的解釋力，顯示政府施政滿意度及國民黨得票率是影響李登輝總統滿意度的主要因素，此外，總體經濟情勢的失業率、通貨膨脹及痛苦指數在模型中則不顯著。限於研究資料，作者認為後續應該可以對一些可能影響總統聲望的重要事件或變數再做探討。

自 1999 年周祖誠的研究之後，國內有關總統滿意度的重要研究不多，以下是一些較具代表性的著作。首先是李世宏與吳重禮 2003 年的文章，他們的主要研究目的是探討評價總統施政表現的因素，並比較不同施政評價的影響因素。他們以「政府整體施政評價」、「經濟發展施政評價」以及「兩岸關係施政評價」等三項，作為政府施政測量變數，而在自變數方面，則依照社會學研究途徑(sociological approach)的觀點，選取年齡、性別、省籍、居住地區，以及教育程度等變數；在社會心理研究途徑(social psychological approach)方面，則選擇政黨認同、族群認同、統獨立場、政治知識，以及「分立政府」等心理認知變數；另外也依據理性抉擇途徑的(rational choice approach)觀點，選擇個體經濟回顧、個體經濟展望、總體經濟回顧、總體經濟展望，以及台灣未來經濟前途評估等變數（李世宏與吳重禮 2003：39）。研究的結果發現：在「整體施政表現評價」方面，年齡、性別、省籍、政黨認同、國家整體經濟的回顧、台灣未來前途評估等因素，的確會左右民眾對於政府整體施政表現的觀感。在「經濟發展施政評價方面」，省籍、居住地區、教育程度、政黨認同、政治知識、分立政府心理認知、個體經濟的回顧與展望、總體經濟的回顧與展望、台灣未來前途評估等，是主要影響因素。至於影響「兩岸關係施政評價」的因素，則是居住地區、政黨認同、統獨立場、政治知識、分立政府心理認知、個體經濟展望、總體經濟展望。他們的研究結果顯示不同施政項目的評價影響因素，確實存在著相當程度的差異(李世宏、吳重禮 2003:52-57)。所以他們認為探討民眾施政評價影響因素時，必須依據施政項目的特性設定相關模型，始能較完整地瞭解相關變數的影響(李世宏、吳重禮 2003:58)。

相較於李世宏與吳重禮以橫剖面資料（cross-sectional data）的研究，盛治仁與白瑋華 2008 年的研究，是以「貫時性與橫斷性<sup>10</sup>共同資料分析」（Pooled Cross-sectional Analysis）來探討影響陳水扁總統首任施政評價的因素。本文運用 TVBS 民調中心在 2000 年到 2004 年間的 21 次調查資料，並依相關文獻作為建構理論架構的依據，將時間、經濟環境、事件、

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<sup>10</sup> 對於 cross-sectional 一詞的譯名，有人譯為橫斷性，也有人譯為橫剖面，目前並未有定論。

政黨認同、意識型態、省籍、年齡、教育程度、性別等可能影響總統施政滿意度的因素放入統計模型。本文的特色在於貫時性與橫斷性的共同資料分析，作者認為：跨時性資料可以得知個人特質變項對施政評價產生的差異性影響，同時也可以讓總體層次的時間、經濟環境、以及事件變成解釋變數，來分析施政評價的趨勢變化，更全面性地瞭解影響施政評價的因素(盛治仁、白瑋華 2008: 12)。研究的主要發現是：1.隨著時間的流逝，總統施政評價有衰退的趨勢；2.在好的經濟環境時，總統施政評價會上升；3.當正面事件發生時，總統施政評價會上升；4.當民眾的政黨認同屬於總統的政黨或總統的政黨聯盟，則該民眾會給予較高的施政評價；5.相對於本省族群（閩南族群與客家族群），外省人通常對（陳水扁）總統施政表現不是很滿意(盛治仁、白瑋華 2008:30-31)，顯示執政時間、經濟環境、重大事件、政黨認同和省籍等都是對施政滿意度起伏造成影響的因素。他們認為本文的限制在於檢驗變項間的共變性，無法建立明確的因果關係；而且所能使用資料有限，僅侷限於一位總統的一屆任期，不能進行不同黨籍或同黨籍總統的比較；同時使用單一民調單位資料，恐有機構效應的問題。他們也認為施政滿意度的評價具有理論與實務重要性，建議未來可以發展的研究領域有：進行各類職務施政評價的比較分析、施政滿意度在台灣政治實際可能造成的影響、分析施政評價與時間關係究竟是線性關係或曲線關係，以及施政評價是否成為選舉的關鍵因素，被選民用以作為回溯性/前瞻性投票的依據(盛治仁、白瑋華 2008:32)

陳陸輝與耿曙 2009 年的文章，則是運用調查的資料，檢視影響總統滿意度的因素，研究的焦點在於解釋民眾總統滿意度的差異（陳陸輝、耿曙 2009b:354）。本文雖然同樣參考美國總統滿意度的分析研究架構，但在變數的建構上，作者認為民眾對於馬英九總統施政表現的評估，除了受個人既有政治立場及經濟環境的影響外，馬英九總統上台後，兩岸關係、經濟發展以及民眾的政治信任，都可能對其施政滿意度造成影響，因此也將民眾對兩岸關係評估、兩岸戰爭可能性、兩岸經貿交流、經濟不佳究責、台灣意識，以及政治信任等因素納入模型之中加以檢視，從和平與繁榮的角度，結合我國特有的國際關係與兩岸情勢，來解釋民眾對總統的滿意度（陳陸輝、耿曙 2009b:353-356），是本文的一大特色。研究結果發現：除了民眾既有的藍綠政治立場，統獨傾向、性別、教育程度、台灣意識都是影響馬英九總統滿意度的因素；就兩岸關係而言，雖然在馬英九總統上任後，兩岸關係大為和緩，兩岸陸續舉行多次「江陳會談」，達成多項協議，但認為兩岸關係轉變得較佳的民眾，未必給予馬總統更高的評價，甚至於在兩岸關係和緩之後，民眾對於兩岸是否會發生戰爭的疑慮既消除，也沒有影響他們對馬總統施政表現的評價。相對而言，經濟因素似乎是主宰民眾評價馬總統的重要標準。當民眾認為兩岸交流對於台灣經濟較為有利與認為經濟情況較佳者，他們才會給馬總統較正面的評價。對於經濟情況不佳的究責上，儘管有超過四分之三的民眾認為是因為國際景氣差所致，但是，當民眾認為是馬政府所造成的，會給予馬總統施政表現較差的評價。此外，民眾的政治信任，也顯著影響他們對於馬總統的施政評價。研究的結果顯示民眾對於總統施政表現的評價，除了民眾的藍綠政治傾向、統獨偏好與台灣意識高低之外，主要是以經濟面向來評估總統。作者認為希望民眾完全擺脫意識型態或是政黨立場來詮釋政治事務並不容易，但能較理性地以經濟利益來對總統究責，對台灣民主政治的良性發展有重要意義（陳陸輝、耿曙 2009b:360-361）。

由於台灣並沒有如美國的期中選舉，可以用來檢視總統滿意度對國會選舉的影響，然而2009年三次立法委員補選發生在馬英九就職兩年之後，林啟耀(2011)認為可以將之視為「另類的期中選舉」，來觀察中央執政表現是否影響2009年三個立法委員補選的投票行為。他的分析發現中央施政表現對於三個選區的投票行為的影響並不相同，在雲林及台北

的選區，中央施政表現是選民投票時的考量，但在苗栗的選區則沒有影響，他認為應是選舉情境不同的關係，雲林及台北的選區是藍綠對決的氛圍，中央施政表現不佳，會影響選民的思維；苗栗選區則是候選人的對決，所以中央施政較不會成為選戰主軸。蕭怡靖和游清鑫(2008)選舉發現在台北及高雄不同政治境之下，選民投票抉擇有所不同，在2006選舉中，台北市選民較考慮候選人評價，而民進黨在高雄的政績則受到高雄民眾的高度肯定，對選民的投票抉擇有重大的影響。蕭怡靖和黃紀(2011)則探討施政表現對不同層級選舉影響，以2009年雲林縣長及鄉鎮市長的選舉作為分析對象，結果發現雲林縣的民眾對於中央施政表現並不滿意，但對連任的蘇治芬縣長的滿意度則相當高，二者差距達五成左右，而中央及地方的施政表現，對於投票抉擇有顯著的影響，但本文也發現不論中央或地方的施政表現，對於鄉鎮市長選舉則沒有影響，顯示地方派系在地方選舉仍然有相當大的作用。俞振華（2012）則探討總統的施政評價如何影響2009年的縣市長選舉，他以2009年選前及選後的調查資料分析的結果，顯示民眾對馬英九總統的滿意度、中央政策是否影響個人的經濟情況、及民眾對整體經濟的評估，都會影響他們的投票抉擇，而「公民複決式」投票模型解釋了2009年地方選舉的選民投票行為，顯示在台灣執政者的表現，的確能夠影響地方選舉的投票行為，同樣呈現如美國總統表現對國會期中選舉的效應。

包正豪(2013)的研究是從政治領袖個人特質的關點，來探討影響馬英九總統施政滿意度的因素。本文使用的資料，來自中央研究院人文社會科學研究中心政治思想研究專題中心與國立政治大學選舉研究中心共同合作之「領導與公民意識」研究計畫，該計畫對於領導個人特質概念的形成，除了來自政治領導相關研究理論之外，為更貼近台灣政治現況，也邀請媒體記者座談<sup>11</sup>，從而建構了品格、度量、遠見、決斷力，以及是否重視公益等五個面向的個人特質，做為一個好的政治領導者應具備的條件，在測量上，則是讓受訪者依其主觀看法，在 0-10 之間對於馬英九總統進行評分，並以此作為探討影響民眾評價馬英九總統的因素。研究的結果發現：馬英九總統政治領導的總體評價的平均分數為 5.23 分，且五項評價的平均都低於 6 分，即使是馬英九總統最引以為傲的品格也僅有 5.70 分，而決斷力則是民眾普遍認為馬英九總統最弱的一環，平均僅有 4.38 分（包正豪 2010:4）。模型分析的結果則顯示，民眾對馬英九總統的施政滿意程度，與對其個人特質評價高低的確息息相關，愈肯定其個人領導特質者，愈傾向肯定其施政表現。然而，本文同時也指出，民眾在評價馬英九總統地個人領導特質時，會受到藍綠政黨傾向、性別、族群認同，以及省籍等因素的強烈影響，亦即對部分民眾而言，即使認可馬英九總統的個人領導特質，仍不會給較為正面的評價（包正豪 2010:19）。

黃紀及王德育則假設民眾對總統的支持，會影響他們的立法委員投票抉擇，而此種效應會因為個人特質及候選人而有所不同，他們使用 2012 年立委選舉的 TEDS 個體層次調查資料及候選人資料進行分析，結果顯示台灣總統的表現，對於立法委員選舉有很大的影響，和美國總統的滿意度對同黨國會議員選舉一樣，有所謂的拉拔效應(coattails)存在，同時也因為同黨立法委員都需要總統的幫助，因而提供總統一個影響立法的重要資源，此種影響力如果應用得宜，總統能夠在推行政策時，可以得到立法院的強力支持。他們也認為在目前台灣所謂半總統制的不正常制度之下，政黨認同的日漸強化與社會上政治分歧的加深，在政治制度上打了一個死結，總統與立法委員選舉間的關聯性，則有助於台灣民主制度的

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<sup>11</sup> 媒體記者專家座談邀請來了自聯合報、中國時報、自由時報等三大主要平面媒體曾專職或長期採訪馬英九總統之五位記者，針對領袖個人特質與領導力問題進行討論。

運作，因為總統需要立法院的支持來實現競選承諾，而立法委員則需要總統的拉拔以在選舉中獲勝(Huang and Wang 2013:184)。

劉嘉薇(2013)則從民眾、記者及社論來探討陳水扁總統聲望的資訊來源及影響因素。本研究「從記者的訪談，分析他們對陳水扁總統領導與聲望的看法，也從報紙社論析釐出報社對總統的施政評價」(2013:26)，強調媒體在總統在塑形聲望的重要性，她發現記者和社論認為陳水扁總統在清廉、經濟問題、族群問題、國際地位、政治互信等方面的表現，有較多的批評，而這些面向和民眾所認知的面向相符，也與導致總統滿意度下降的原因一致。本研究的特色是串連媒體、總統聲望及總統領導三項概念，同時也以實證資料佐證三者間的關聯，是總統滿意度研究的一個新途徑。近年來政治人物的聲望，不論是好是壞，幾乎都是透過媒體的塑造，因此，國內外的研究都開始重視媒體或是網路社群媒體在政治上的影響力，我們也認為媒體如何報導政事及形塑總統形象，也應是總統滿意度研究的重要一環。

王德育及鄭夙芬(Wang and Cheng 2015)的研究以在 2008 年以高票當選的馬英九總統為研究對象，主要原因在於民眾對於他的表現，在他剛當選時約有六～七成者表示滿意，但沒多久滿意度就急速下降，在 2012 年連任後不久，甚至已降至僅剩一成左右。本文運用調查資料、鄉鎮層級選舉結果資料與焦點團體訪談資料，來探討台灣民眾如何評估總統的表現，以及有哪些因素可以解釋馬英九總統任期內滿意度不斷下降的原因。結果發現：和傳統的研究結果一致，也發現經濟因素在總統滿意度的評估上佔有重要地位，然而台灣民眾對於馬英九總統表現的評估，是同時基於國家整體經濟及個人經濟情況，也與其處理兩岸關係、內政與外交能力有密切關係。此外，對馬英九總統用人能力的批評，也影響對其表現的評價，這是在總統滿意度的研究中，較為特殊的一個發現；反而是馬英九總統一再強調的品格因素，對於他持續下跌的滿意度並沒有助益。

湯晏甄及張傳賢(Tang and Chang 2016)則使用台灣選舉民主化調查 2008 年選前及選後的追蹤調查資料，來探討民眾對馬英九總統滿意度變化的原因。他們的研究發現當馬總統的表現無法符合他們的期望時（尤其是在經濟表現及兩岸關係上），對他的滿意度隨之下降；而受訪者的媒體使用時間愈多，政治資訊愈多讓民眾對馬英九的評價愈低。顯示台灣民眾對馬英九表現的評估，不僅與政治環境有關，也與民眾的政治能力及政治態度有關。

#### 四、 研究方法

本研究對總統滿度的測量與應用作系統的分析，並追蹤民眾對總統滿意度的變化情形、可能的影響因素、總統滿意度對政策推行的影響，以及對民主政治的可能效果，為了達到上述目的，以質性的焦點團體研究法與量化調查訪問結合的混合性方法(mixed method)研究設計，是本計畫的特點。本計畫執行期間（2019 年 8 月 1 日至 2020 年 7 月 31 日），蔡英文總統的滿意度根據 TEDS 的調查，相對於 2018 年 12 月九合一選舉挫敗時，僅有 21.9%的民眾對其表現表示滿意的低迷情況，然而在 2020 年 1 月總統大選前，蔡總統的滿意度已回昇至 51.7%，主要的原因應與蔡總統對 2019 年 1 月初習近平「一國兩制台灣方案」的強硬回應，以及對自 2019 年 3 月開始的香港反送中爭民主運動的支持，得到民眾的贊許有關，而蔡英文總統也以 817 萬多票的超高票數順利連任。有鑑於蔡總統滿意度的變化，本計畫在 2020 年總統選舉前，先進行焦點團體訪談，探討民眾對於蔡英文總統滿意度的意見、變化情形及原因，同時也比較民眾對兩位候選人的看法及議題的立場，資料除了可以用以理解民眾對蔡英文總統滿意度的變遷情況及成因，同時也可以理解民眾對兩位總統候選人在候選人形象上的看法，以及他們對國



家定位與認同立場的意見。接著也在選前進行一次電話訪問，以探討總統滿意度及其他議題與投票行為的關係。

在 2020 年 1 月總統選舉結束後不久，新型冠狀病毒肺炎疫情開始在全世界漫延，台灣的超前佈署及口罩等防疫政策與措施，讓台灣成為全球疫情中的淨土，防疫成效也得到世界的贊揚。台灣也從對世界衛生組織呼籲 Taiwan can help，到實際展開 Taiwan is helping 以口罩援助其他國家，而有「我台灣、我驕傲」感受，蔡英文總統的滿意度也在 2020 年 3 月超過六成來到 65.5%再創新高。由於新冠肺炎已不僅是國家而是全球性的危機，為了測試蔡總統的滿意度高漲的現象，是否符合總統滿意度理論的「聚旗效應」(rally-round-the flag effect)，本計畫於 2020 年 5 月底開始對選舉前的電訪受訪者，進行追蹤調查 (panel study)，成功追蹤 604 位受訪者。在這次的調查中，除了探討總統滿意度的變化情形，重點也在於探討民眾對於各項防疫措施、口罩政策、紓困政策、及經濟發展等議題的看法。

## 五、 結果與討論

本計畫目前共完成二篇文章，一是使用 TEDS 總統滿意度調查資料，與王德育教授合著之探討蔡英文總統第一任前二年施政狀況評估的” Presidential Popularity in Taiwan: The Tsai Ing-wen Era”，發表於 2019 年 American Political Science Association 年會（以下為文章的全文），本文發現蔡英文總統第一任前二年施政滿意度不佳，主要在於對經濟發展、民生問題、及兩岸關係的施政表現無法讓民眾滿意。另一篇也是與王德育教授合作，以選前及選後追蹤調查資料所完成的 ” COVID-19 and Anatomy of the Rally Effect: the Case of Taiwan”。本文主要從口罩政策、政黨支持及經濟發展角度來探討聚旗效應，我們發現由於蔡英文總統在此次疫情中表現，的確在台灣產生聚旗效應，即使是泛藍的民眾，也會因為口罩政策，轉而給予蔡英文總統正向滿意的評價。本文應該是台灣首篇探討聚旗效應的研究，也是少數美國以外國家的相關研究。由於本文已投稿 Asian Survey 進入審查程序，不方便列入報告，僅附上投稿證明。

本計畫所進行的調查，最可貴的是針對疫情前後總統滿意度的變化進行追蹤調查，資料相當可貴，除了探討旗聚效應之外，可用的資料甚多，我們也將陸續再進行其他論文的撰寫。本計畫的研究團隊以有限的經費，完成了一個焦點團體訪談及二次電話訪問，尤其是有新冠疫情此種重大事件發生，研究團隊為了掌握此一相當難得的研究契機，同時也為了讓追蹤調查的樣本達到可靠分析的份數，在計畫經費不足的情況下仍然決定進行調查，不足的費用係由計畫主持人以個人過去的計畫結餘款來支付，因此，經費不足問題實為本計畫執行過程中最大的限制與困難。另外，本計畫核定的赴國外發表文章之差旅費，也不足以支應前往美國參加國際學術會議的費用，建議是否也應參酌計畫主持人過去參與國際會議情形來核定出國經費。

# **Presidential Popularity in Taiwan:**

## **The Tsai Ing-wen Era**

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Voluminous research on presidential popularity has been produced during the last half century (See, Fox, 2009; Gronke and Newman, 2003; Kriner, 2006). The extant scholarly interest in the subject is because presidential approval ratings are not only a reflection of public support for a president but also an important indicator of presidential effectiveness (Stimson, 1976). High approval ratings, even only within the party, usually increase the president's bargaining power and influence, as U.S. president Donald J. Trump has demonstrated. Although Trump's nation-wide popularity only hovered around 45%, he has received strong support within the Republican Party since taking the office. Thus, Trump has been able to break with "past practices of presidential behavior and decorum," shake "up American politics" and challenge "the postwar liberal world order" (Bernhard and O'Neill, 2019: 317). Few Republican congressional members are willing to contradict Trump's decisions and policies. However, Trump's low nation-wide approval rating also contributed to the Republican Party's loss in the 2018 mid-term election. This shows that presidential approval frequently plays a crucial role in the president's party or his/her own re-election bid. A number of studies have documented the impact of approval ratings on congressional as well as presidential elections (Gronke, Koch, and Wilson, 2003; Lewis-Beck and Rice, 1982; 1984; Newman and Ostrom, 2002), presidential policy initiatives and legislative success (Canes-Wrone and Shotts, 2004; Canes-Wrone and de Marchi, 2002; Ostrom and Simon, 1985), and veto politics (Rohde and Simon, 1985). Research of presidential approval thus speaks to important questions rooted in the democratic theory.

This study aims to examine presidential popularity in Taiwan. Interestingly, Taiwan presidents' approval ratings seemed to decline rather fast after the election. Despite their high popularity immediately after elections, both Presidents Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party or KMT) and Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have only been able to maintain roughly 20% to 25% approval ratings throughout their tenure. How do Taiwan citizens evaluate their presidents? Pooling multiple waves of survey data collected in Taiwan, this study aims to examine factors contributing to presidential approval ratings in Taiwan.

## **Presidential Approval: the Theory**

“There can be little doubt that the economy matters for presidential popularity,” as Norpoth succinctly stated more than three decades ago (1985: 180). Indeed, empirical literature on American presidency have demonstrated that economic conditions of the society are critical to presidential popularity (Clarke, Rapkin, and Stewart, 1994; Kinder, 1981; Muller, 1970; 1973; Norpoth, 1985; Stimpson, 1976). When the state of the economy is good, the president gains public support. When the economy deteriorates, the approval rating declines. Economics, therefore, is “the fate of politicians” (Norpoth, 1985: 167). Following the logic of “reward-punishment,” a sociotropic hypothesis has been developed, which maintains that the state of the national economy plays a central role in the mind of citizen-as-evaluator. Presidential approval rises as the public perceives a healthy national economy and the rating declines when the overall economic prospect appears to be gloomy. Rather than focusing on the health of national economy, an alternative argument was developed with an emphasis on citizens’ personal economic well-being. Known as the pocketbook hypothesis, it maintains that voters are more likely to punish the incumbent president when their personal well-being suffers. The quote from Ronald Reagan’s 1980 presidential debate that “[a]re you better off than you were four years ago?” has been cited as a typical appeal to voters’ personal economic conditions (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007).<sup>12</sup>

While the state of the economy plays a central role in presidential popularity, other factors may also contribute to voters’ assessment of presidential performance. The president’s character and integrity have attracted scholarly attention. V. O. Key’s insight of “the role of [a president’s] personality” provides an intellectual origin of this inquiry. It has been argued that the presidency is the principal position in the government and it sets public standards for all political behavior. Character and integrity of the president provides a clue how he/she will run the government. In addition, the assessment of presidential character provides citizens with a useful shortcut without constantly looking for otherwise costly information (Greene, 2001; Kinder, 1986). Presidential character thus is likely to play an important role in citizens’ evaluation of presidents (McCurley and Mondak, 1995: 865).

Again, Trump is a case in point. Because the economy in the U.S. is doing so well Trump believes he will surely win the 2020 presidential election. However, Trump’s approval rating has been hovering around 40% since inauguration. While the majority of American citizens feel that the national economy is in good condition and they are better off today than they were in 2016, a majority of them disapprove Trump’s job performance (Quinnipiac University, 2019). Pundits attributed Trump’s low approval rating to his racist attitude, authoritarian tendency, and temperamental unfitness for the presidency – all of which are

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<sup>12</sup> For the full text of the October 28, 1980 presidential debate between Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter, see the website of the Commission on Presidential Debates at <http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-28-1980-debate-transcript>.

unrelated to the state of the economy but reflect his characters (Sargent, 2019). Taiwan's former President Ma Ying-jeou presented a different case. Ma was characterized as a "Teflon pot" (*buzhanguo*) due to his non-corruptible image and self-discipline but, interestingly, his righteous image presents no effect on his approval rating (Wang and Cheng, 2015).

Empirical studies have also demonstrated that presidential performance in areas other than economy are also relevant to citizens' assessment of the president. In an era of globalization, foreign policy has been considered a key factor to presidential approval as it frequently has important implications to domestic affairs, especially the economy. Studies have shown that various international events, including foreign trade, have effects on how citizens assess the performance of the person in the office (Burden and Mughan, 2003). Again, Trump's foreign trade policy is a good example as many of his supporters turned against him because they were hurt by the US-China trade dispute and imposed tariffs on imported steel and aluminum. Some observers note that public attitudes about foreign affairs are consequential in presidential elections as "[t]he candidates are waltzing before a reasonable alert audience." When given a choice, "the public votes for the candidate who waltzes best" (Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida, 1989: 136). Presidential approval ratings thus depend just as much on the handling of foreign affairs as they do on the management of the economy (Aldrich, et al., 1989; Burden and Mughan, 2003; Marra, Ostrom, and Simon, 1990; McAvoy, 2006; Nickelsburg and Norpoth, 2000).

The above discussion thus yields the following theoretical expectations to be examined in the subsequent sections. That is, presidential approval is affected by the public's assessment of a president's performance in various areas, particularly in the areas of economy and external relations.

### **Presidential Approval During Tsai's Presidency**

In a three-way presidential race, Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), who was rejected by voters four years ago, won a landslide victory to become the island country's first female president in Taiwan's 2016 presidential election. Tsai garnered 56% of the votes, compared to 31% of the KMT candidate, Eric Chu, and 12.8% of the PFP candidate, James Soong. The DPP's fortune also extended to the 2016 legislative election as the party secured a majority in the 113-seat legislature. For the first time in the country's democratic history, the DPP took control of both the executive and legislative branches.

The DPP electoral success was extraordinary. Analysts attributed the victory to voters' anxiety over the island's political and economic prospects. When Tsai's predecessor, President Ma Ying-jeou, was in office, he adopted an engagement policy toward China and expanded economic relationships between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. To reduce cross-Strait tension, Ma endorsed the "1992 Consensus," a tacit understanding that the notion of "one China" should serve as the basis for cross-Strait interactions, without specifying precisely what it means. By accepting the notion that both sides of the Taiwan Strait are of one nation, however it is

defined, the Chinese government naturally welcomed Ma's policies. As a result, more than 20 agreements were reached between Taipei and Beijing during Ma's presidency, including a landmark trade deal in which the Chinese government made significant economic concessions.<sup>13</sup> Deepening cross-Straits economic relationships nevertheless raises the concern of many Taiwan citizens, fearing that intense economic interactions with the Chinese mainland may increase the island country's vulnerability.

Meanwhile, as cross-Straits trade and tourism boomed the economic reality was far from Ma's campaign promises. Even as big businesses make profits, wages are stagnant, economic inequality has worsened and homeownership is beyond the reach of most citizens. Although the unemployment rate has finally dropped below 4% since 2014, it is higher than those of neighboring countries. In particular, youth unemployment has been hovering around 12-13 percent between 2010 and 2015.<sup>14</sup>

Taiwan's gloomy economic prospect and citizens' anxiety over the island's sovereignty provided an opportunity for Tsai Ing-wen. During the presidential campaign, Tsai promised to energize Taiwan's economy and strived to maintain cross-Straits "status quo." Tsai's cross-Straits policy was the result of a bitter lesson from her 2012 presidential bid. Indeed, analysts attributed to her 2012 unsuccessful bid to voters' concerns about her ability to maintain cross-Straits peace and stability (Hickey and Niou, 2016). Not to repeat past mistakes, Tsai took an ambiguous position on cross-Straits relations during the 2016 presidential campaign and pledged to support the "status quo," implying that, if elected, her administration would not pursue Taiwan's formal independence. After taking the office, she nevertheless refuses to endorse the "1992 Consensus" that Beijing leaders have considered vital for cross-Straits interactions. Instead, she declared that "the new government will conduct cross-Straits affairs in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution, the Act Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and other relevant legislation."<sup>15</sup> Not surprisingly, Chinese leaders provided a cold reception and applied different measures to pressure Tsai to return to the Consensus. They suspended all official communications with the Tsai administration and drastically reduced the number of mainland tourists visiting Taiwan aiming to hurt the island's tourist industry. Beijing has further launched a concerted effort to place diplomatic pressure on Taipei by whittling down its few remaining diplomatic allies. Since 2016, Beijing successfully lured five countries to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan and

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<sup>13</sup> For details of the trade deal, known as the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), see the website of Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China <<http://www.mac.gov.tw/lp.asp?ctNode=5921&CtUnit=4142&BaseDSD=7&mp=3>>. Accessed January 15, 2016.

<sup>14</sup> The 2015 unemployment rates for Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea were 2.0%, 3.3%, 3.6%, and 3.5%, respectively. <<http://www.stat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=38919&ctNode=519&mp=4>>. Accessed Jan. 20, 2015.

<sup>15</sup> Tsai Ing-wen. "President Tsai Ing-wen's inaugural address." Taipei Times, May 21 <<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/print/2016/05/21/2003646753>>, accessed June 14, 2019.

established relationship with China, leaving only 17 nations that officially recognize Taipei.<sup>16</sup> Taiwan was also excluded from the International Civil Aviation Organization and the World Health Assembly meetings due to Beijing's objection. In addition, China has repeatedly sent military aircraft and ships to circle Taiwan with a goal of intimidating the Taipei government and the island citizens (Tan, 2019). In January of 2019, Chinese leader Xi Jinping used a speech on Taiwan to equate the consensus with a "one country, two systems" framework of governance for Taiwan, drawing a rare rebuke from both DPP and KMT politicians.

To counter Beijing's pressure, the Tsai administration implemented the "New Southbound Policy" aiming to shift Taiwanese trade and investment to Southeast Asia. Analysts, however, remain skeptical about the effectiveness of the plan.<sup>17</sup> That said, Taiwan's overall economy has been improving since 2016 as quarterly data published by the government show that GDP grew between 2.08% and 3.48%, compared to -0.14% in the first quarter of 2016 when Tsai took office.<sup>18</sup> The total unemployment rate is below 4% during this period but the youth unemployment rate for those between 20-24 of age remained high, hovering around 12-13%.<sup>19</sup> While Taiwan's economy under Tsai's watch has improved but its economic fruits have not been shared equally. As one high-ranking official of the Tsai administration candidly admitted, the government's inability to ensure that the effects of the nation's economic growth would trickle down to ordinary people was the first of the several contributing factors to the DPP's disastrous setback in the 2018 local election.<sup>20</sup>

Meanwhile, the Tsai administration introduced a host of reform agenda on pensions reform, long-term care service, a minimum wage, amending the Labor Standards Act and the Electricity Act. These efforts failed to be appreciated by the general public. For example, the latest Labor Standards Act aimed to implement a five-day work week with two mandatory days off. During the process, it was encountered fierce opposition from both employers and employees as they expressed dissatisfaction with the rigidity of the new rules. The act had to be amended twice in a year. There was also widespread dissatisfaction with the pension reform, which cut pensions of civil service and military retirees. Tsai's personnel appointments also raised eyebrows, including withdrawing nomination for the Judicial Yuan and accepting the

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<sup>16</sup> These five countries are: Sao Tome and Principe (December 2016), Panama (June 2017), Dominican Republic (May 2018), Burkina Faso (May 2018), and El Salvador (August 2018).

<sup>17</sup> Some analysts believe that the trade dispute between China and the U.S. under the Trump administration may provide an opportunity for Tsai's New Southbound Policy (Shapiro, 2019).

<sup>18</sup> National Statistics, R.O.C. (Taiwan) <<https://www.stat.gov.tw/np.asp?ctNode=492&mp=4>>, accessed June 13, 2019.

<sup>19</sup> The total unemployment rates are for 2016, 2017 and 2018 are 3.92%, 3.76% and 3.71%, respectively, the youth unemployment rates are 12.62%, 12.38% and 11.98% <<https://www.stat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=17166&ctNode=517&mp=4>>, accessed June 13, 2019.

<sup>20</sup> "Lai to step down as premier 'when time is right'." Taipei Times, December 8 <<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/print/2018/12/08/2003705708>>, accessed June 14, 2019.



resignation of her nominee for a high-ranking diplomatic post for drunk driving. In two and a half years since taking office, Tsai has appointed three premiers with significant shuffling of her cabinet. Observers attributed the DPP's 2018 local election setback to these missteps and flip-flops.

[Figure 1 about here]

To assess Tsai's presidential approval ratings, this study employs 11 waves of surveys conducted in Taiwan during Tsai's term.<sup>21</sup> In each of the surveys, Taiwan citizens over the age of 20 were asked the following question: "How satisfied are you with her overall performance as President over the past six months?" Respondents' answers to this question are treated as the measure of *presidential approval*. Along with the data collected in previous surveys, Figure 1 shows Tsai's presidential approval ratings between June 2016 and December 2018. The figure shows that the president enjoyed a honeymoon period immediately after inauguration as her presidential popularity in June of 2016 reached 52.7%. Her approval rating dropped about 25% three months later to 28.7% in September and has since declined steadily to about 22% by December 2018, the last month that the data are available. How can Tsai's popularity be explained? What are the factors responsible for Tsai's declining approval rating? To address these questions, statistical analyses are provided in the following section.

### **Explaining Presidential Approval: Analysis**

As we explained elsewhere, time series analysis is a powerful investigative tool for studying presidential approval (Wang and Cheng, 2015). It is not used here because 1) due to Taiwan's short democratic history, time-series data on presidential approval either on a yearly or quarterly basis are not available. We thus employ data collected through the aforementioned six surveys conducted in Taiwan. 2) Citizens' support for politicians is a personal decision. An analysis of survey data with individual respondent as the unit of analysis can investigate the linkage between the conditions and an individual's choice-making process. We thus pool the data collected through the aforementioned 11 surveys conducted in Taiwan for analysis.

Table 1 shows Taiwan citizens' assessments of President Tsai's job performance in seven key areas since June of 2016 and they all display a downward trend. The first two measures, *boosting the national economy* and *improving people's livelihood*, elicit respondents' sociotropic

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<sup>21</sup> Through telephone interviews, the surveys were conducted quarterly under the auspice of the Planning and Executive Committee of the Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) Project. The coordinator of the multi-year TEDS project is Professor Chi Huang and the data are managed and distributed by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University in Taiwan. More information is available on the TEDS website (<http://www.tedsnet.org>).

concern and pocketbook concern, respectively. The third measure taps citizens' assessment of her management of *cross-Strait relations*. As the ratings of all three areas range from 16% to 27% in 2018, they show that Taiwan citizens had a low appraisal of Tsai's performance. Although the President enjoyed higher marks in managing *foreign affairs* and *national defense*, they were in the mid 20% to lower 40% in 2018. Taiwan citizens also questions her ability of *staffing key cabinet positions, leadership, and trustworthiness*. The only area that Tsai enjoyed an above average rating consistently is her *integrity*, which shows that citizens viewed her as a politician with high moral standards.

Table 2 shows the effects of citizens' performance appraisal on Tsai's approval ratings in various areas. First, it shows a strong relationship between appraisals of boosting economy, improving people's livelihood and managing cross-Strait affairs and presidential approval. Indeed, 72% to 97% of the respondents who were satisfied with Tsai's performance in the three areas provided positive presidential evaluation. Second, respondents' assessment of Tsai's performance in foreign affairs, national defense, staffing key cabinet positions, as well as of her personal characters of integrity, leadership, and trustworthiness also affect Tsai's popular support, albeit less so. This shows citizens' appraisals of Tsai's performance in various areas appear to have an effect on her popularity.

[Table 1 and Table 2 about here]

The above analysis shows that Tsai has suffered from a rapid and continual decline in approval ratings during her presidency since 2016. Taiwan citizens expressed substantial dissatisfaction with her performance in various areas, and in particular in managing issues related to national economy, people's livelihood and cross-Strait relationship. The discontents contribute to Tsai's low popularity. To ascertain these findings are not spurious, a multivariate analysis will be conducted.

The dependent variable, *presidential approval*, is coded dichotomously with 1 indicating positive appraisal and 0 otherwise. The nine indicators listed in Table 1 are the key independent variables in the analysis and they are also coded dichotomously with 1 signifying respondents' satisfaction with Tsai's performance and personal characters in the relevant category. In addition, several control variables are included in the analysis. Previous studies show that presidential approval varies according to individuals' political affiliation (Fox, 2009; Hibbs, Rivers, and Vasilatos, 1982a; Clarke, Stewart, Ault, and Elliott, 2005). A respondent's partisan identification is important in Taiwan also because it generally reflects the individual's

position on the issue of “unification vs. independence,” as previously indicated.<sup>22</sup> Two partisan dummy variables, *Pan-Blue affiliation* and *Pan-Green affiliation*, are created accordingly with 1 for respondents in the relevant category and 0 otherwise with nonpartisan voters as the baseline group. Respondents of the pan-Blue camp are those who are identified with the KMT, the People’s First Party, and the New Party, while the pan-Green camp includes those identified with the DPP, and the New Power Party. Two dummy variables, *Taiwanese* and *Chinese*, are created to assess respondents’ identification. Respondents with a dual identity (i.e., consider themselves as both a Taiwanese and a Chinese) serve as the base category. To control the effect of individuals’ demographic characteristics, respondents’ ethnicity, levels of education, gender and age are also included. Respondents’ ethnicity is recoded into two dummy variables, *Hakka* and *Mainlander*, which are coded 1 for respondents in the relevant category and 0 otherwise with *Benshengren* as the baseline group.<sup>23</sup> *College education* is created with 1 for respondents who have a college (and above) degree and *female* is coded as a dummy variable according to respondents’ gender. The variable of *age* is a continuous variable and is measured by the number of years since birth.

A logit model with binary outcomes is thus employed instead. Specifically, the regression model takes the form of

$$\ln \Omega(\mathbf{x}) = \ln \frac{\Pr(y = 1|\mathbf{x})}{\Pr(y = 0|\mathbf{x})} = \mathbf{x}\boldsymbol{\beta}$$

where  $\ln \Omega(\mathbf{x})$  is the natural logarithm of the conditional odds of having a positive presidential approval relative to having a negative approval,  $\mathbf{x}$  is a vector of independent variables that includes all independent variables, and  $\boldsymbol{\beta}$  is a vector of regression estimates. Note that the questions on presidential integrity and Tsai’s management of key cabinet posts were not included in several surveys and the inclusion of the variables of *integrity* and *staffing key cabinet positions* automatically eliminates about 2,900 cases. To avoid the possibility of biasing the results due to different sample sizes, two panels of regression outcomes are thus presented in Table 3, with and without the two variables. The table shows that, the regression results are

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<sup>22</sup> Variables assessing respondents’ unification/independence positions were included in the analysis and they were not statistically significant. For the sake of having a parsimonious model, this study excludes the variables of respondents’ unification/independence positions.

<sup>23</sup> *Benshengren*, Hakka and Mainlander are the three major ethnic groups in Taiwan. Taking about 77 percent of the island’s residents, *Benshengren* refers to island residents whose ancestors migrated to Taiwan from the Chinese mainland several hundred years ago and is the largest ethnic group on the island. Hakka refers to the 10% island resident who are descendants of immigrants migrating to Taiwan roughly at the same time as *Benshengren* from areas in central China. With about 12% of the total population, mainlanders are those Chinese migrants who fled to the island at the end of the Chinese civil war. While the mainlander is not a homogeneous ethnic group due to its diverse origins from various Chinese provinces, the rocky start from the moment the forces of Chiang Kai-shek first arrived on Taiwan in 1945 and the subsequent historical development have imposed a distinct but common ethnic identity on those who are known as “mainlanders.”

consistent between the two panels, which suggest that the outcomes are quite robust. Table 3 presents the results and reveals several major findings

[Table 3 about here]

First of all, all regression coefficients in both panels associated with Tsai's perceived performance in various areas and personal characters are statistically significant and bear positive signs. Despite the substantial difference in sample size, the statistical results of both panels are very similar, which shows that the results are rather robust. The results also ascertain that the findings in Table 2 are not spurious. In particular, both sociotropic and pocketbook hypotheses are confirmed, that is, presidential popularity is conditioned by citizens' concerns over national economic well-being and personal welfare. In fact, citizens' concern about a healthy national economy is the single most important contributor to Tsai's approval rating because it has the largest effect. As the two panels in Table 3 show, respondents who appreciate Tsai's abilities of boosting national economy are 3.8 to 4.4 times more likely in odds to give a positive presidential rating. Citizens' concerns over their personal well-being also exert substantial effects on presidential popularity. Tsai's ability in managing the state of the economy thus plays a vital role in citizens' appraisal of her job performance as a president.

Second, citizens' concerns over cross-Strait relations, foreign affairs and national defense also exert substantial effects on Tsai's popularity, albeit to a lesser degree. Those who appreciate Tsai's performance are about 2 times more likely in odds to give a positive presidential approval. This reflects Taiwan citizens' anxiety over the island country's relationship with China, which has important implications to almost every aspect of their lives. As Beijing leaders assertively claim sovereignty over the island and refuse to renounce the use of military force against Taiwan while continuing to isolate Taipei internationally, the public's assessment of a president's management of cross-Strait relations, foreign affairs and national defense naturally plays an important role in their presidential approval.

Third, Tsai's personal characters and her leadership also play an important role in citizens' assessment of her popularity. Those who consider her trustworthy and/or a person with integrity or a good leader are 1.6 to 2.8 times more likely in odds to provide a positive presidential approval

As expected, pan-Blue supporters were less likely to give Tsai's a positive rating by a factor about 1.5. A surprising finding is that the coefficients associated with pan-Green affiliation are statistically insignificant indicating that Tsai failed to win the support of her own base. While there is a partisan divide in Taiwan in presidential approval, Tsai's low popularity in part is due to the loss of support from her own base.

Finally, all but one of the regression coefficients in the two panels related to respondents' identity, ethnicity, education levels, gender and age are statistically insignificant, indicating that respondents' demographic characteristics have little effects on their approval for the president.

## Conclusions

Presidential popularity plays a central role in democratic politics. Approval ratings are more than a snap shot of public support for the person in power but also a key to comprehending presidential power. The above findings show that Tsai's popularity is highly related to citizens' appraisals of her presidential performance in various areas and personal characters. Consistent with the conventional wisdom as well as the previous findings in Taiwan (Chen and Keng, 2009; Lee and Wu, 2003; Sheng and Pai, 2008; Wang and Cheng, 2015), the state of the economy plays a vital role in the island country's presidential popularity. While voters in the U.S. are more attentive to the nation's economic health (Kinder, 1981; Clarke and Stewart, 1994; MacKuen, et al., 1992), Taiwan citizens' evaluation of the job performance of the person in power is based on the country's overall economic conditions as well as their personal well-being. Such a finding may be due to the influence of Confucianism. The old saying that "while the ruler treats the populace paramount to his ruling, the populace consider livelihood supreme to their existence" (*wang zhe yi min wei tian, er min yi shi wei tian*) suggests that improving people's livelihood is the principal issue for the ruler. Taiwan citizens thus hold the president accountable for their personal hardship as much as asking him/her to be responsible for the health of national economy.

Contrary to the observation that public attitudes towards foreign policy lack intellectual structure and tend to be unstable (Almond, 1950), the findings of this study along with those gathered in the American setting (Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida, 1989; Marra, Ostrom, and Simon, 1990) show that citizens are cognitive in these areas. Indeed, Taiwan citizens are quite attentive to presidential performance in the areas of cross-Strait relations, diplomacy and national defense because China is considered an economic opportunity as well as the major security threat. The island's relationship with China has important implications to every aspect of the island citizens' lives. Given that the president is facing a reasonably alert public, performance in these areas also contribute to Taiwan's presidential popularity.

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
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**Figure 1. Tsai Ing-wen's Presidential Approval Rating:  
June 2016 - December 2018**



**Table 1. Percentages of Satisfaction with  
President Tsai's Performance in Key Areas**

(based on valid cases)

	<b>2016/06</b>	<b>2016/09</b>	<b>2016/12</b>	<b>2017/03</b>	<b>2017/06</b>	<b>2017/09</b>	<b>2017/12</b>	<b>2018/03</b>	<b>2018/06</b>	<b>2018/09</b>	<b>2018/12</b>
Boosting the Economy	57.3	34.4	32.0	30.2	22.6	27.4	23.6	20.9	21.1	21.1	16.4
Improving People's Livelihood	65.6	48.1	35.1	32.4	28.9	36.1	27.8	26.5	24.6	25.8	21.9
Cross-Strait Relations	62.7	39.6	37.5	36.2	27.9	31.6	30.2	26.9	25.4	25.0	20.5
Foreign Affairs	78.0	47.3	45.3	46.1	36.1	37.8	38.1	37.2	26.0	25.7	28.2
National Defense	76.5	49.8	47.5	44.5	47.5	44.5	36.1	39.9	42.1	43.5	41.0
Staffing Key Cabinet Positions	58.9	35.6	34.9	n/a	33.3	n/a	36.3	n/a	28.1	n/a	24.9
Leadership	74.6	n/a	45.4	42.8	39.6	39.5	38.9	34.9	33.5	30.3	25.9
Trustworthy	74.6	n/a	45.4	42.8	39.6	39.5	38.9	34.9	33.5	30.3	25.9
Integrity	77.3	n/a	65.7	n/a	60.2	n/a	59.0	n/a	53.3	n/a	52.2

**Table 2. Presidential Approval Rating and Satisfaction in Issue Areas**

	<b>2016/06</b>		<b>2016/09</b>		<b>2016/12</b>		<b>2017/03</b>		<b>2017/06</b>	
	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
Boosting the Economy	97.3	40.8	91.3	23.5	87.9	17.3	86.6	19.1	84.4	15.6
Improving People's Livelihood	96.3	34	82.2	16.3	82.2	18.9	82.2	18.6	74.2	13.3
Cross-Strait Relations	97.7	32.7	85.5	20.6	81.7	12.3	84.3	15.8	74.5	12.4
Foreign Affairs	94.7	18.6	83.4	17.7	75.8	12.7	74.7	12.5	72.4	9
National Defense	92.3	27.1	78	21.6	71.2	13.7	72.8	16.5	62.8	7.4
Staffing Key Cabinet Positions	93.5	42.8	81.9	28.6	75.2	21.5	n/a	61.7	62.8	7.4
Leadership	90.2	23.1	n/a	n/a	73.7	15.1	72.7	15.5	64.4	11.1
Trustworthy	93.5	30.5	82.2	14.1	77	11.7	75.3	14.1	65.5	8.6
Integrity	89.8	23.6	n/a	n/a	58.9	11.4	n/a	n/a	49.6	8.1

**Table 2. Presidential Approval Rating and Satisfaction in Issue Areas  
(continued)**

	2017/09		2017/12		2018/03		2018/06		2018/09		2018/12	
	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
Boosting the Economy	88.9	20.5	87.3	18.7	87.4	15.6	81.7	12.5	84.7	14.3	81.7	13.9
Improving People's Livelihood	77.4	18.1	79.4	17	80.7	12.9	75.1	11.4	81.8	10.3	73.8	12.6
Cross-Strait Relations	84.7	17.3	78	14.8	81.3	11.8	76	11.4	77.3	11.7	72.3	11.1
Foreign Affairs	75.6	17.2	70.2	10.8	68.5	9.4	76.6	8.9	75.4	12.2	63.5	9.5
National Defense	68.5	16.4	70.4	15.1	67.4	10.6	57.6	8	58.9	7	52.7	7.7
Staffing Key Cabinet Positions	n/a	n/a	65.2	17.1	n/a	n/a	65.3	11.3	n/a	n/a	63	13.3
Leadership	74.4	16.3	68.2	14.2	75.7	8.9	66.6	8.5	73.2	11.4	65.3	12.1
Trustworthy	72.3	15.9	73.3	11.9	77	9.9	70.5	8.4	75.6	11.9	66.3	7.7
Integrity	n/a	n/a	53.8	8.4	n/a	n/a	46.7	7.1	n/a	n/a	44.6	6.2

Notes:

1. Percentages of presidential approval in cells;
2. Y: "Satisfaction" in the relevant category; N: "Dissatisfaction" in the relevant category.

**Table 3. Presidential Approval in Taiwan: Logit Analysis**

Variables	Panel 1		Panel 2	
	Coef. (s.e.)	% ch. (O.R.)	Coef. (s.e.)	% ch. (O.R.)
Boosting the Economy	1.33*** (0.15)	279.2 (3.79)	1.48*** (0.12)	337.9 (4.38)
People's Livelihood	0.98*** (0.13)	165.8 (2.69)	1.12*** (0.10)	205.6 (3.06)
Cross-Strait Relations	0.74*** (0.14)	110.3 (2.10)	0.90*** (0.11)	146.6 (2.47)
National Defense	0.72*** (0.13)	106.3 (2.06)	0.80*** (0.10)	121.5 (2.22)
Diplomacy	0.91*** (0.13)	149.6 (2.50)	0.67*** (0.10)	95.1 (1.95)
Staffing Key Cabinet Positions	0.34** (0.14)	40.0 (1.40)	--	--
Integrity	0.66*** (0.16)	93.2 (1.93)	--	--
Trustworthy	1.05*** (0.14)	186.0 (2.86)	1.14 (0.11)	211.5 (3.12)
Leadership	0.52*** (0.14)	68.0 (1.68)	0.90 (0.10)	145.2 (2.45)
Pan-Blue	-0.45** (0.16)	-36.0 (0.64)	-0.56*** (0.13)	-42.8 (0.57)
Pan-Green	0.21 (0.14)	24.0 (1.24)	0.15 (0.11)	16.4 (1.16)
Hakka	0.12 (0.18)	13 (1.13)	0.09 (0.13)	9.0 (1.09)
Mainlander	-0.18 (0.22)	-16.0 (0.84)	-0.28 (0.17)	-24.5 (0.76)
Taiwanese	-0.01 (0.13)	-1.0 (0.99)	0.17 (0.10)	19.6 (1.19)
Chinese	-0.88 (0.48)	-58.0 (0.42)	-0.60 (0.34)	-45.4 (0.55)
College Education	-0.14 (0.13)	-13.0 (0.87)	-0.21 (0.10)	-19.1 (0.81)
Female	0.02 (0.12)	2.0 (1.02)	0.08 (0.10)	8.0 (1.08)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.0 (1.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.0 (1.00)
N	3877		6769	

Note: Coef.=Regression coefficient; s.e.=standard error; % ch.=percentage change in odds; O.R.=odds ratio; \* $p<0.05$ ; \*\* $p<0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p<0.001$ , two-tailed test.

## 投稿證明

Subject: **Successful submission of manuscript COVID-19 and Anatomy of the Rally Effect: the Case of Taiwan to Asian Survey**



"COVID-19 and Anatomy of the Rally Effect: the Case of Taiwan" has been **successfully submitted** to *Asian Survey*. **The editors have been notified.**



# 科技部專題研究計畫出席國際學術會議心得報告

日期： 2019 年 9 月 19 日

計畫編號	MOST 108-2410-H-004-153-SSS		
計畫名稱	總統滿意度之研究		
出國人員 姓名	鄭夙芬	服務機構 及職稱	政治大學選舉研究中心 研究員
會議時間	2019 年 8 月 29 日 至 2018 年 9 月 1 日	會議地點	美國華盛頓特區
會議名稱	(中文)  (英文) 2019 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting		
發表題目	(中文)  (英文) <b>Presidential Popularity in Taiwan: The Tsai Ing-wen Era</b>		

## 一、參加會議經過

成立於 1903 年的美國政治學會(The American Political Science Association, 簡稱 APSA)，是美國政治學界會員最多、影響力最深遠的學術性組織。目前擁有來自八十餘個國家的一萬五千多名會員。每年的年會都有將近 7000 名來自全美國及世界各地的學者參與，亦是國際政治學界的盛事。文章發表於 Conference Group of Taiwan Studies (簡稱 CGOTS) 的場次，今年 CGOTS 有五個場次，共有 20 篇文章發表，議程如下：

**8:00 AM - 9:30 AM, Friday, August 30, 2019**

**I. Panel Title: Reunderstanding Cross-Strait Relations: The Status Quo? The One-China Policy?**

Chair: Robert Sutter, George Washington University

Discussants: Scott Kastner, the University of Maryland and Kuen-Da Lin, Georgia Institute of Technology

1. A Neo U.S. One-China Policy? Content Analyzing Obama's and Trump's Positions  
Dean Chen, Ramapo College of New Jersey  
Yao-Yuan Yeh, University of St. Thomas
2. The Polarization of Cross-Strait Relations since 2016: the Status Quo at Stake  
S. Philip Hsu, National Taiwan University
3. The One China Policy and the International Status of Taiwan  
Mikulas Fabry, Georgia Institute of Technology
4. Nationalism, Alliances, and Geopolitics: US-China-Taiwan Ties under Trump and Xi  
Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, Adelphi University

**10:00 AM – 11:30 AM, Friday, August 30, 2019**

**II. Panel Title: New Theories and New Evidence: Studies of Turnout and Election in Taiwan**

Chair: Hans Stockton, University of St. Thomas

Discussants: Timothy S. Rich, Western Kentucky University and Nick Lin, Academia Sinica

1. Declining Voter Turnout in Taiwan: A Generational Effect?  
T.Y. Wang, Illinois State University  
Christopher H. Achen, Princeton University
2. Reverse Coattails Effects and Electoral Fortune in Taiwan's Local Elections  
Kuan-chen Lee, Academia Sinica  
Karl Ho, University of Texas, Dallas
3. Critical Citizens or Electoral Losers? A Panel Study of 2018 Taiwan's Election  
Hsin-hao Huang, National Taiwan Normal University
4. The Impact of Polling Primaries on Electoral Performance  
Eric Chen-hua Yu, National Chengchi University

**12:00 PM – 1:30 PM, Friday, August 30, 2019**

**III. Panel Title: Public Opinion Research in Taiwan: Old Topics and New Angles**

Chair: Da-Chi Liao, National Sun Yat-sen University

Discussants: Lu-Chung Dennis Weng, Sam Houston State University and  
Ching-Hsing Wang, National Cheng Kung University

1. Democratic deficit in Taiwan? A longitudinal study of corruption perception  
Chilik Yu, Shih Hsin University
2. Presidential Popularity in Taiwan: from Ma Ying-jou to Tsai Ing-wen  
T.Y. Wang, Illinois State University  
Su-Feng Cheng, National Chengchi University
3. “Return” of Chinese identity? Exploring some recent developments  
Shiau-chi Shen, Soochow University
4. Public Support for the Use of Force in Weak States  
Kuan-Sheng Wu, Purdue University  
Yao-Yuan Yeh, University of St. Thomas  
Fang-Yu Chen, Michigan State University  
Austin Horng-En Wang, Duke University

**2:00 PM – 3:30 PM, Friday, August 30, 2019**

**IV. Panel Title: Legislative Politics and Emerging Social Issues in Taiwan**

Chair: David An, Catholic University of America/Global Taiwan Institute

Discussants: Wei-ting Yen, Franklin and Marshall College and Fang-Yu Chen,  
Michigan State University

1. Election Cycle and Roll Call Requests: Identifying the Target Audience  
Weihao Huang, Academia Sinica  
Greg Chih-Hsin Sheen, London School of Economics and Political Science
2. Electoral Rules, Party Discipline, and Parliamentary Questions in Taiwan  
Nick Lin, Academia Sinica  
Jinhyeok Jang, National Sun Yat-sen University
3. Unpacking LGBT Acceptance in Taiwan: What Explains Taiwan’s Public Support?  
Timothy S. Rich, Western Kentucky University  
Isabel Eliassen, Western Kentucky University
4. Court as Political Evasion: The Case of Interpretation No. 748 in Taiwan  
Yu-Hsien Sung, University of South Carolina  
Chin-shou Wang, National Cheng Kung University

**4:00 PM – 5:30 PM, Friday, August 30, 2019**

**V. Panel Title: Social Media, Big Data Analysis, and Electoral Politics in Taiwan**

Chair: Christopher H. Achen, Princeton University

Discussants: Eric Chen-hua Yu, National Chengchi University and T.Y. Wang,  
Illinois State University

1. How Connective Populism Was Made Online--A Case Study of the Han Tide in 2018  
Da-Chi Liao, National Sun Yat-sen University  
Frank Liu, National Sun Yat-Sen University
2. Social Media and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Taiwan  
Chia-hung Tsai, National Chengchi University  
Ching-Hsing Wang, National Cheng Kung University
3. The Effect of Social Media on Vote Choice: The Case of Taiwan  
Lu-Chung Dennis Weng, Sam Houston State University  
Chi Huang, National Chengchi University
4. The interaction between politician and netizens in Facebook: A big data approach  
Yu-Wei Hu, Chinese culture University  
JUNG CHUN CHANG, SOAS, University of London

**6:30 PM – 7:30 PM, Friday, August 30, 2019**

**Conference Group on Taiwan Studies (CGOTS) Business Meeting**

## 二、與會心得

本(2019)年度 CGOTS 有五個場次，是歷年來最佳的成果，由於 American Political Science Association 對各相關研討會團體(related conference group)的場次數目及經費補助，是以所屬場次的參與人數來決定，CGOTS 歷年最佳的狀況曾有四個場次，近年來因為研討會團體增加甚多，APSA 大會的資助較為緊縮，這幾年來即使幾位 Coordinators 不斷爭取，參與者也都踴躍出席，經常也都僅能拿到一~二個場次。因此，為了確保下年度在 APSA 年會的經費與場次，每年所有參與 CGOTS 的中外學者，除了以論文內容吸引聽眾之外，也幾乎都很團結地全程參與各場次，團結的氣氛令人感動。尤其特別感謝去年卸任的 Coordinator Kharis A. Templeman 教授的努力與貢獻，為今年爭取到五個場次，是非常難得的成就，當然 CGOTS 能夠在 APSA 年會中持續得到良好的評價，也來自所有成員的盛情支持。今年也有許多位在國外教學年輕的學者及就讀的學生來參與 CGOTS 的場次及活動，對於 CGOTS 的未來發展是值得欣喜的現象。

今年的五個場次在 Coordinator 葉耀元教授的交涉下，集中在 8 月 30 日一天同一個場地，除了讓與會者不必在三個旅館會場的會議廳間奔波往返之外，也有助於集中參與。場次從早上 8 點開始，每場都座無虛席，出席相當踴躍，每場的發表人、評論人及參與者也都有針對論文內容，也有許多的互動與討論，臺灣議題能吸引聽眾興趣及引發熱烈討論，相當另人振奮。本人與王德育教授的文章發

表後，除了評論人 Dennis Weng 教授給予相當多深具建設性的建議外，許多學者也於會中及會後和我們進行了一些討論對於本文也多有鼓勵，所有的意見及建議都令我們受益良多。前來參與場次的國外學者對於臺灣問題也深感興趣，因此，透過參與此一會議，不僅可以與來自全世界的政治學者交換研究心得，也推廣了台灣學術研究的成果。

### 三、發表論文摘要

Presidential popularity plays a central role in democratic politics. Approval ratings are more than a snap shot of public support for the person in power but also a key to comprehending presidential power. Our findings show that Tsai's popularity is highly related to citizens' appraisals of her presidential performance in various areas and personal characters. Consistent with the conventional wisdom as well as the previous findings in Taiwan (Chen and Keng, 2009; Lee and Wu, 2003; Sheng and Pai, 2008; Wang and Cheng, 2015), the state of the economy plays a vital role in the island country's presidential popularity. While voters in the U.S. are more attentive to the nation's economic health (Kinder, 1981; Clarke and Stewart, 1994; MacKuen, et al., 1992), Taiwan citizens' evaluation of the job performance of the person in power is based on the country's overall economic conditions as well as their personal well-being. Such a finding may be due to the influence of Confucianism. The old saying that "while the ruler treats the populace paramount to his ruling, the populace consider livelihood supreme to their existence" (*wang zhe yi min wei tian, er min yi shi wei tian*) suggests that improving people's livelihood is the principal issue for the ruler. Taiwan citizens thus hold the president accountable for their personal hardship as much as asking him/her to be responsible for the health of national economy.

Contrary to the observation that public attitudes towards foreign policy lack intellectual structure and tend to be unstable (Almond, 1950), the findings of this study along with those gathered in the American setting (Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida, 1989; Marra, Ostrom, and Simon, 1990) show that citizens are cognitive in these areas. Indeed, Taiwan citizens are quite attentive to presidential performance in the areas of cross-Strait relations, diplomacy and national defense because China is considered an economic opportunity as well as the major security threat. The island's relationship with China has important implications to every aspect of the island citizens' lives. Given that the president is facing a reasonably alert public, performance in these areas also contribute to Taiwan's presidential popularity.

#### 四、建議

CGOTS 在美國政治學會年會持續獲得良好的評價，今年甚至有五個場次的補助，是相當不容易的成績，全賴國內外相關學者的努力與支持，而且對於推廣台灣的研究成果、促進國際對台灣的瞭解、以及擴大與國際的學術交流方面，有相當大的貢獻。近年來國際機票及生活費用都相當昂貴，許多大學也不提供參與國際學術會議的補助，懇請科技部能提高參與國際學術會議的補助金額，以提高參與的動機及減輕與會者的經濟壓力。

#### 五、攜回資料名稱及內容

美國政治學會議程及文件已全面上網，所以沒有攜回任何資料。

108年度專題研究計畫成果彙整表

計畫主持人：鄭夙芬			計畫編號：108-2410-H-004-153-SSS		
計畫名稱：總統滿意度之研究					
成果項目			量化	單位	質化 (說明：各成果項目請附佐證資料或細項說明，如期刊名稱、年份、卷期、起訖頁數、證號...等)
國內	學術性論文	期刊論文	0	篇	
		研討會論文	0		
		專書	0	本	
		專書論文	0	章	
		技術報告	0	篇	
		其他	0	篇	
國外	學術性論文	期刊論文	0	篇	
		研討會論文	1		於2019年美國政治學會年會發表 "Presidential Popularity in Taiwan: The Tsai Ing-wen Era"
		專書	0	本	
		專書論文	0	章	
		技術報告	0	篇	
		其他	1	篇	使用選前選後的調查資料，撰寫學術論文"COVID-19 and Anatomy of the Rally Effect: the Case of Taiwan"一篇，已投稿Asian Survey審查中
參與計畫人力	本國籍	大專生	0	人次	
		碩士生	0		
		博士生	0		
		博士級研究人員	0		
		專任人員	0		
	非本國籍	大專生	0		
		碩士生	0		
		博士生	0		
		博士級研究人員	0		
		專任人員	0		
其他成果 (無法以量化表達之成果如辦理學術活動、獲得獎項、重要國際合作、研究成果國際影響力及其他協助產業技術發展之具體效益事項等，請以文字敘述填列。)			本計畫掌握新冠肺炎疫情期間，總統滿意度變化的契機進行追蹤調查，所完成的 "COVID-19 and Anatomy of the Rally Effect: the Case of Taiwan"，目前已投稿，若能正式發表，應該是台灣首篇探討聚旗效應的研究，也是少數美國以外國家的相關研究，同時也能讓國際理解台灣政府與民間在防疫上優秀表現的內在因素		